¶6 It is certainly not by chance that so many minds are today haunted by the idea of the ‘end of the world’; this may be regretted in some respects, for the extravagances to which this misunderstood idea gives rise, the ‘messianic’ ramblings that are its consequence in various circles, all these manifestations arising from the mental imbalance of our time, only further aggravate that same imbalance to a degree that is not absolutely negligible;1 but after all, it is nonetheless certain that there is here a fact that cannot be ignored. The most convenient attitude, when one observes things of this kind, is assuredly that which consists in setting them aside purely and simply without further examination, treating them as errors or insignificant daydreams; we think, however, that even if they are indeed errors, it is better, while denouncing them as such, to seek the reasons that provoked them and the part of truth, more or less distorted, that may nevertheless be contained in them, for, error having in sum only a purely negative mode of existence, absolute error cannot be encountered anywhere and is only an empty word devoid of meaning.2 If one considers things in this way, one easily perceives that this preoccupation with the ‘end of the world’ is closely linked to the state of general unease in which we presently live: the obscure presentiment of something that is indeed near to ending, acting uncontrolled upon certain imaginations, naturally produces in them disordered representations, most often crudely materialised, which, in turn, outwardly translate into the extravagances to which we have just alluded.3 This explanation is not, moreover, an excuse in favour of them; or at least if one can excuse those who fall involuntarily into error, because they are predisposed to it by a mental state for which they are not responsible, this can never be a reason to excuse error itself.4 Moreover, as far as we are concerned, we certainly cannot be reproached for excessive indulgence towards the ‘pseudo-religious’ manifestations of the contemporary world, any more than towards all modern errors in general; we even know that some would rather be tempted to make the opposite reproach to us, and perhaps what we say here will make them better understand how we envisage these things, striving always to place ourselves at the only point of view that matters to us, that of impartial and disinterested truth.5
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Summary

Guénon observes that the idea of the ‘end of the world’ haunts many minds, which is no accident. The extravagances and messianic ramblings that result from this misunderstood idea aggravate the mental imbalance of the age, but this phenomenon must be taken into account. Instead of dismissing it as a mere error, it is better to seek its causes and the distorted part of truth it contains, since absolute error does not exist. This preoccupation is linked to the current state of general unease: the obscure presentiment of an approaching end produces disordered and crudely materialised representations, which in turn produce these extravagances. This explanation does not excuse error itself, even if one can excuse those who fall into it involuntarily. Guénon adds that he cannot be reproached for excessive indulgence towards pseudo-religious manifestations or modern errors. He always places himself at the point of view of impartial and disinterested truth.

General notes

  1. divagations « messianiques » — Rendered as 'messianic ramblings'. Guénon alludes here to the pseudo-religious, millenarian, sectarian or theosophical movements which, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, multiplied announcements of an imminent end of the world, of a forthcoming 'Messiah' or 'Great Monarch', etc. These elaborations, which mix distorted traditional elements with personal fantasies, are for him a symptom of mental imbalance, not a source of knowledge. He does not reject them with contempt, but analyses them as pathological phenomena revealing a profound crisis. The problem is not the idea of an end, but the crude and materialised way in which it is understood, which adds to the confusion instead of remedying it. ↩︎
  2. erreur absolue — Rendered as 'absolute error'. Guénon recalls a fundamental metaphysical principle: error is not a positive reality, but a privation or distortion of truth. There is therefore no absolute error, completely devoid of any mixture of truth, just as there is no absolute darkness without any light, nor absolute cold without any heat. Absolute error would be a contradiction in terms, for it would suppose the existence of something that participated in no way in Being. This conception has important methodological consequences: even in the most false opinions, there is always something to understand, namely the distorted truth that is their core, and above all the state of mind that produced them. ↩︎
  3. quelque chose qui est effectivement près de finir — Rendered as 'something that is indeed near to ending'. Guénon affirms here, with remarkable clarity, that the presentiment of an end is not a pure illusion. What is near to ending is not the physical world, but a certain state of civilisation, a certain cyclical phase, a certain mode of thought and social organisation. The 'end of the world' seized upon by popular imaginations is the materialised and catastrophist transposition of a more subtle reality: the end of a cycle, and therefore the possibility of the beginning of another. The error is not to have the presentiment, but to materialise it crudely and to attach to it concrete images of cataclysms. ↩︎
  4. excuser l'erreur elle-même — Rendered as 'excuse error itself'. Guénon clearly distinguishes between judgment on persons and judgment on ideas. One can understand and even pity men who, in a state of mental imbalance for which they are not fully responsible, fall into extravagances. But that does not make their ideas any more acceptable or true. Intellectual charity does not go so far as to confirm error. Truth is one; error, even involuntary, remains error. This is a demanding position, refusing both contempt for persons and relativism of ideas. ↩︎
  5. vérité impartiale et désintéressée — Rendered as 'impartial and disinterested truth'. Guénon here recalls his fundamental position: neither apologist nor ordinary polemicist, he seeks neither to please nor to displease, nor to convince those who do not wish to be convinced. He does not take sides in profane debates, does not defend one thesis against another on the same plane. He expounds traditional truth as such, with no other concern than fidelity to that truth. Impartiality is not indifference, but refusal to enter into partisan games. Disinterestedness means that he has no other goal than knowledge and its transmission, without worldly or political ulterior motive. ↩︎