¶6 We must recall again, although we have already indicated it, that the modern sciences do not have a character of disinterested knowledge, and that, even for those who believe in their speculative value, this is scarcely more than a mask behind which hide wholly practical preoccupations, but which allows one to preserve the illusion of a false intellectuality.1 Descartes himself, in constructing his physics, thought above all of deriving from it a mechanics, a medicine and a morality;2 and, with the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon empiricism, it became something else again;3 moreover, what gives science its prestige in the eyes of the general public is almost solely the practical results it allows one to achieve, because, here again, it is a question of things that can be seen and touched. We said that ‘pragmatism’ represents the culmination of all modern philosophy and its last degree of abasement;4 but there is also, and for a longer time, outside philosophy, a diffuse and unsystematised ‘pragmatism’, which is to the former what practical materialism is to theoretical materialism,5 and which merges with what the vulgar call ‘common sense’.6 This almost instinctive utilitarianism is moreover inseparable from the materialist tendency: ‘common sense’ consists in not going beyond the terrestrial horizon, as well as in not concerning oneself with everything that has no immediate practical interest; it is above all for it that the sensible world alone is ‘real’, and that there is no knowledge that does not come from the senses; for it also, this restricted knowledge is worth only to the extent that it allows one to satisfy material needs, and sometimes a certain sentimentalism, for, we must say it clearly at the risk of shocking contemporary ‘moralism’, feeling is in reality very close to matter.7 In all this, no place remains for intelligence, except insofar as it consents to enslave itself to the realisation of practical ends, to be no more than a simple instrument subjected to the exigencies of the inferior and corporeal part of the human individual, or, according to a singular expression of Bergson, ‘a tool for making tools’8; what constitutes ‘pragmatism’ in all its forms is total indifference towards truth.9
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Summary

Guénon recalls that modern sciences lack disinterested knowledge, as their supposed speculative value merely masks practical preoccupations and preserves the illusion of a false intellectuality. He notes that Descartes himself aimed to derive mechanics, medicine, and morality from his physics, and that Anglo-Saxon empiricism intensified this tendency, with the public valuing science almost solely for its tangible practical results. He describes pragmatism as the culmination of modern philosophy, but also notes a diffuse, unsystematised pragmatism outside philosophy, merging with common sense, which restricts itself to the terrestrial horizon and immediate practical concerns. This instinctive utilitarianism is inseparable from materialism: common sense regards the sensible world alone as real and knowledge as valuable only for satisfying material needs or sentimentalism. In this view, intelligence remains only as an instrument for practical ends, and the essence of pragmatism in all its forms is total indifference towards truth.

General notes

  1. fausse intellectualité — Rendered as ‘false intellectuality’. Guénon here distinguishes authentic intellectuality (the disinterested search for truth for its own sake, which is the mark of the pure intellect) from modern pseudo-intellectuality, which is only the instrument of practical and utilitarian ends. Modern science adorns itself with the appearances of pure knowledge, but its true motivation is technical and utilitarian. ↩︎
  2. Descartes et l’utilitarisme de la science — Rendered as ‘Descartes and the utilitarianism of science’. Guénon cites Descartes as a paradigmatic example of this practical orientation. Descartes wrote in the Discourse on Method (sixth part) that scientific knowledge should make men ‘as masters and possessors of nature’, aiming at technical applications (mechanics), medical applications (medicine) and even moral applications (a ‘provisional morality’). Knowledge is not sought for its own sake. ↩︎
  3. empirisme anglo-saxon — Rendered as ‘Anglo-Saxon empiricism’. Guénon means by this the British philosophical tradition (Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume) which insists on the sensible origin of knowledge and on practical utility as a criterion of value. Empiricism radicalises the utilitarian tendency already present in Descartes. ↩︎
  4. « pragmatisme » comme aboutissement de la philosophie moderne — Rendered as ‘pragmatism as the culmination of modern philosophy’. Guénon refers to the pragmatist philosophical movement (Peirce, James, Dewey) which makes practical utility and concrete consequences the criterion of truth. For Guénon, pragmatism is the most complete expression of the decadence of modern thought, because it openly subordinates truth to practical interest, instead of seeking it for its own sake. ↩︎
  5. pragmatisme diffus et non systématisé — Rendered as ‘diffuse and unsystematised pragmatism’. Guénon distinguishes philosophical pragmatism (explicit doctrine) from a spontaneous and unreflective utilitarian attitude that permeates the common mentality. This ‘diffuse’ pragmatism is more fundamental and more widespread than its philosophical formulation. ↩︎
  6. « bon sens » vulgaire comme pragmatisme instinctif — Rendered as ‘vulgar “common sense” as instinctive pragmatism’. Guénon criticises the modern valorisation of ‘common sense’ as a criterion of truth. This common sense is only the set of utilitarian prejudices of an epoch, the refusal of everything that goes beyond the horizon of immediate material concerns. ↩︎
  7. le sentiment est tout près de la matière — Rendered as ‘feeling is very close to matter’. Guénon states an anthropological principle: feeling (affectivity, emotion) belongs to the inferior part of the being, that which is closest to matter and the body. Sentimental values (sensibility, compassion, etc.) are often opposed to crude materialism, but they are only a more subtle and deceptive form of it, for they remain prisoners of the corporeal domain. ↩︎
  8. « un outil à faire des outils » (Bergson) — Rendered as ‘a tool for making tools (Bergson)’. Guénon cites the famous formula of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) in Creative Evolution (1907), where human intelligence is defined as the faculty of fabricating artificial instruments. For Guénon, this definition reduces intelligence to a pure utilitarian and technical function, denying its capacity for disinterested contemplation of truth. This is the clearest expression of the pragmatist abasement of intelligence. ↩︎
  9. indifférence totale à l’égard de la vérité — Rendered as ‘total indifference towards truth’. Guénon defines pragmatism by its ultimate criterion: not ‘is it true?’ but ‘is it useful?’. This substitution of the useful for the true is the very abandonment of authentic intellectuality. The pragmatist may even admit that a belief is false while retaining it if it is useful — which for Guénon is an absurdity and a degradation. ↩︎