¶4 Moderns, in general, conceive of no other science than that of things which are measured, counted and weighed — that is to say, still, in sum, of material things, for it is only to these that the quantitative point of view can be applied;1 and the pretension of reducing quality to quantity is very characteristic of modern science.2 One has arrived, in this direction, at believing that there is no science properly speaking where it is not possible to introduce measurement, and that there are no scientific laws except those that express quantitative relations;3 the ‘mechanism’ of Descartes4 marked the beginning of this tendency, which has only accentuated itself since then, in spite of the failure of Cartesian physics, for it is not linked to a determinate theory, but to a general conception of scientific knowledge. One wishes today to apply measurement even in the psychological domain,5 which escapes it, however, by its very nature; one ends by no longer understanding that the possibility of measurement rests only on a property inherent in matter, namely its indefinite divisibility,6 unless one thinks that this property extends to everything that exists, which amounts to materialising all things. It is matter, as we have already said, that is the principle of division and pure multiplicity;7 the predominance attributed to the quantitative point of view, and which, as we have shown previously, is found even in the social domain, is therefore indeed materialism in the sense we indicated above, although it is not necessarily linked to philosophical materialism, which it moreover preceded in the development of the tendencies of the modern mind.8 We shall not insist upon what is illegitimate in wishing to reduce quality to quantity, nor upon what is insufficient in all the explanatory attempts that are more or less attached to the ‘mechanistic’ type;9 this is not what we propose, and we shall only note, in this regard, that, even in the sensible order, a science of this kind has only very little relation with reality, the most considerable part of which necessarily escapes it.10
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Summary

Guénon observes that moderns recognise no science beyond that of things that can be measured, counted, and weighed, since the quantitative point of view applies only to material things, and the attempt to reduce quality to quantity is highly characteristic of modern science. He notes that this tendency, beginning with Cartesian mechanism, has led to the belief that measurement defines science and that only quantitative relations constitute scientific laws. The wish to apply measurement even to psychology fails to recognise that measurement rests on matter’s indefinite divisibility, and to extend this property to everything amounts to materialising all things. The predominance of the quantitative point of view, found even in the social domain, is thus materialism in his broad sense, though not necessarily tied to philosophical materialism. He concludes that even within the sensible order, such a science has very little relation to reality, the greater part of which necessarily escapes it.

General notes

  1. point de vue quantitatif — Rendered as ‘quantitative point of view’. Guénon means by this the scientific attitude that recognises as valid only what is measurable, countable or weighable. This point of view, legitimate in the study of matter, becomes illegitimate when one claims to extend it to all orders of reality, including qualitative domains (psychological, spiritual, metaphysical). ↩︎
  2. réduire la qualité à la quantité — Rendered as ‘reducing quality to quantity’. Guénon identifies here a fundamental trait of modern scientific thought: the idea that qualitative properties (colour, flavour, beauty, value) are only subjective appearances whose underlying reality is purely quantitative (numbers, measurements, mathematical relations). This reduction is characteristic of mechanism and physicalism. ↩︎
  3. lois scientifiques comme relations quantitatives — Rendered as ‘scientific laws as quantitative relations’. Guénon criticises the presupposition according to which a ‘scientific law’ worthy of the name must be formulable in mathematical terms. This conception excludes in advance all knowledge of qualitative or spiritual realities, for they do not lend themselves to such a formulation. ↩︎
  4. « mécanisme » de Descartes — Rendered as ‘mechanism of Descartes’. Guénon refers to Cartesian physics, which explained all natural phenomena (including life and sensation) by movements of material particles acting according to mechanical laws. Although Cartesian physics was abandoned, its ideal of a purely quantitative and mechanical explanation of the world survived. ↩︎
  5. mesure dans le domaine psychologique — Rendered as ‘measurement in the psychological domain’. Guénon alludes to psychometrics, experimental psychology and attempts to ‘quantify’ mental phenomena (intelligence, emotions, personality). For him, these attempts are illegitimate because the psyche, by its very nature, escapes quantitative measurement. ↩︎
  6. divisibilité indéfinie de la matière — Rendered as ‘indefinite divisibility of matter’. Guénon recalls a fundamental principle: matter is essentially divisible (one can always divide it into smaller parts), and it is this property that makes measurement possible. Non-material realities (spirit, consciousness, metaphysical principles) do not possess this divisibility and therefore cannot be measured. ↩︎
  7. matière, principe de division et multiplicité pure — Rendered as ‘matter, principle of division and pure multiplicity’. Guénon takes up a Neoplatonic and scholastic theme: matter is the principle of individuation and fragmentation. It is matter that transforms unity into multiplicity. To wish to measure or quantify spiritual realities is therefore to apply a material property to them illegitimately. ↩︎
  8. prédominance de la quantité avant le matérialisme philosophique — Rendered as ‘predominance of quantity before philosophical materialism’. Guénon notes historically that the quantitative attitude (measuring, counting, weighing) imposed itself in modern science even before philosophical materialism was formulated as a doctrine. This shows that practical materialism is more fundamental and older than theoretical materialism. ↩︎
  9. type « mécaniste » — Rendered as ‘“mechanistic” type’. Guénon means by this any explanation that reduces complex phenomena (biological, psychological, social) to purely mechanical interactions of their material components. Mechanism is the methodological expression of materialism. ↩︎
  10. même dans l’ordre sensible, la science quantitative échoue à saisir la réalité — Rendered as ‘even in the sensible order, quantitative science fails to grasp reality’. Guénon affirms that modern science, despite its pretension to be the only valid knowledge of the sensible world, grasps only an infinitesimal part of it. Concrete qualities (colour, flavour, odour, warmth, beauty) are left aside in favour of abstract measurements. Sensible ‘reality’ is infinitely richer than what equations can capture. ↩︎