¶9 This brings us immediately to state in what respect the idea that the majority must make the law is essentially erroneous, for, even if this idea, by the force of things, is above all theoretical and cannot correspond to an effective reality, it still remains to explain how it could become implanted in the modern mind, what are the tendencies of the latter to which it corresponds and which it satisfies at least in appearance.1 The most visible defect is that very one that we indicated just now: the opinion of the majority can only be the expression of incompetence,2 whether this results from lack of intelligence or from sheer ignorance; one might bring into play in this connection certain observations of ‘collective psychology’3 and recall in particular that rather well-known fact that, in a crowd, the ensemble of mental reactions that occur between the component individuals results in the formation of a sort of resultant which is not even at the average level, but at that of the most inferior elements.4 There would also be cause to point out, on the other hand, how certain modern philosophers have wished to transfer into the intellectual order the ‘democratic’ theory that makes the opinion of the majority prevail, by making of what they call ‘universal consent’ a pretended ‘criterion of truth’5: even supposing that there were actually a question on which all men agreed, this agreement would prove nothing by itself;6 but, moreover, if this unanimity really existed – which is all the more doubtful in that there are always many men who have no opinion on any given question and who have never even asked themselves the question – it would in any case be impossible to ascertain it in fact, so that what is invoked in favour of an opinion and as a sign of its truth is reduced to being only the consent of the greatest number, and moreover limited to a milieu necessarily very restricted in space and time.7 In this domain, it appears even more clearly that the theory lacks foundation, because it is easier to escape the influence of feeling, which on the contrary comes into play almost inevitably when it is a question of the political domain;8 and it is this influence that is one of the principal obstacles to the understanding of certain things, even among those who would otherwise have an intellectual capacity largely sufficient to attain this understanding without difficulty;9 emotional impulses prevent reflection, and it is one of the most vulgar clevernesses of politics to take advantage of this incompatibility.
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Summary

Guénon states that the idea that the majority must make the law is essentially erroneous, since the opinion of the majority can only express incompetence, whether from lack of intelligence or sheer ignorance. He invokes collective psychology, noting that in a crowd the mental reactions of individuals produce a resultant at the level of the most inferior elements, not even the average. He criticises certain modern philosophers for transferring this democratic theory into the intellectual order by making ‘universal consent’ a pretended criterion of truth, arguing that even real unanimity would prove nothing and cannot be factually ascertained. In the intellectual domain, he observes, it is easier to escape the influence of feeling, which inevitably plays a role in politics and prevents reflection. Emotional impulses, he concludes, are a major obstacle to understanding, and politics commonly exploits this incompatibility.

General notes

  1. idée que la majorité doit faire la loi — Rendered as ‘the idea that the majority must make the law’. Guénon attacks here the fundamental principle of representative democracy: the majority rule. For him, this principle is not only practically contestable but essentially erroneous from a logical and metaphysical point of view. The majority can only be the numerical expression of a multitude, never the source of a qualitatively superior authority. ↩︎
  2. l’avis de la majorité ne peut être que l’expression de l’incompétence — Rendered as ‘the opinion of the majority can only be the expression of incompetence’. Guénon reaffirms here the principle already stated: competence being the apanage of a minority, the opinion of the majority is necessarily that of the incompetent. This is not a moral judgment but a statistical and logical observation founded on the very nature of knowledge and expertise. ↩︎
  3. « psychologie collective » — Rendered as ‘collective psychology’. Guénon refers to the work of crowd theorists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, notably Gustave Le Bon (The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind, 1895) and Gabriel Tarde. Their observations on the lowering of the average mental level in crowds and on the mechanisms of psychic contagion are here used to criticise the pretensions of majority rule. ↩︎
  4. résultante au niveau des éléments les plus inférieurs — Rendered as ‘resultant at the level of the most inferior elements’. Guénon states a law of crowd psychology: in a human assembly, the average intellectual level does not maintain itself but sinks towards the lowest common denominator, that is to say towards the most primitive instincts and the least reflective reactions. This phenomenon invalidates any claim to make collective opinion a criterion of validity. ↩︎
  5. « consentement universel » comme critérium de la vérité — Rendered as ‘“universal consent” as a criterion of truth’. Guénon targets here philosophical currents such as Scottish common-sense philosophy (Thomas Reid) or certain forms of traditionalism that sought to make consensus gentium (the agreement of all men) a criterion of truth. For Guénon, even if such an agreement existed, it would remain a contingent fact, not a metaphysical principle. ↩︎
  6. cet accord ne prouverait rien par lui-même — Rendered as ‘this agreement would prove nothing by itself’. Guénon applies here the principle of the distinction between the order of fact and the order of right. Whether a universal agreement exists or not (which is empirically doubtful), this never constitutes a proof of truth. Truth is demonstrated by intrinsic reasons, not by the number of adhesions. ↩︎
  7. milieu forcément très limité dans l’espace et dans le temps — Rendered as ‘milieu necessarily very restricted in space and time’. Guénon underlines the practical impossibility of verifying a supposed ‘universal consent’. Any poll or consultation can only bear upon a sample restricted spatially and temporally. Effective universality is beyond reach; what one deals with is never anything but the consent of a particular group, presented under a misleading label. ↩︎
  8. influence du sentiment dans le domaine politique — Rendered as ‘influence of feeling in the political domain’. Guénon here distinguishes the intellectual order (where reason can, at least in principle, exercise itself without passion) from the political order (where affects, prejudices and partisan allegiances systematically distort judgment). This is why the error of the ‘criterion of consent’ is even more flagrant in politics: majority opinion is there contaminated by emotion and collective irrationality. ↩︎
  9. impulsions émotives empêchant la réflexion — Rendered as ‘emotional impulses prevent reflection’. Guénon diagnoses here a well-known phenomenon: emotion blocks clear thought. Even the most intelligent individuals can become incapable of seeing the obvious when their affects (national pride, partisan loyalty, collective fear or hope) are engaged. Politics knowingly exploits this human weakness. ↩︎