¶5 But enough on philosophy, to which it is not fitting to attribute an excessive importance, whatever the place it seems to hold in the modern world; from the point of view where we place ourselves, it is above all interesting in that it expresses, in as clearly defined a form as possible, the tendencies of one or another moment, rather than truly creating them; and, if one can say that it directs them up to a certain point, it is only secondarily and after the fact.1 Thus, it is certain that all modern philosophy has its origin in Descartes; but the influence that he exercised first on his epoch, then on those that followed, and which was not limited to philosophers alone, would not have been possible if his conceptions had not corresponded to pre‑existing tendencies, which were in sum those of the generality of his contemporaries; the modern spirit found itself in Cartesianism and, through it, took on a clearer consciousness of itself than it had had until then.2 Moreover, in any domain, a movement as apparent as Cartesianism was in the philosophical respect is always a resultant rather than a true point of departure; it is not something spontaneous, it is the product of a whole latent and diffuse work; if a man like Descartes is particularly representative of the modern deviation, if one can say that he incarnates it, as it were, from a certain point of view, he is nevertheless not its sole nor its first responsible party, and one would have to go back much further to find the roots of this deviation.3 Likewise, the Renaissance and the Reformation, which are most often regarded as the first great manifestations of the modern spirit, completed the break with tradition much more than they provoked it; for us, the beginning of this break dates from the 14th century, and it is there, and not one or two centuries later, that, in reality, modern times must be made to begin.4
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Summary

Guénon cautions against attributing excessive importance to philosophy, noting that it expresses pre‑existing tendencies rather than creating them, and directs them only secondarily. All modern philosophy originates with Descartes, but his influence was possible only because his ideas corresponded to tendencies already present among his contemporaries; Cartesianism gave the modern spirit a clearer self‑awareness. A movement like Cartesianism is a resultant of latent, diffuse work, not a spontaneous point of departure; Descartes represents the modern deviation but is neither its sole nor first cause, whose roots lie much earlier. The Renaissance and Reformation completed the break with tradition rather than provoking it; for Guénon, the break began in the 14th century, which is when modern times truly start.

General notes

  1. philosophie comme expression — Rendered as ‘philosophy as expression’. Guénon relativises the importance of philosophy. In tradition, philosophy is not an end in itself; it is only a reflection of the deeper tendencies of an epoch. Modern philosophy did not create the modern spirit; it expressed it and made it conscious of itself. This is why one can study philosophy as a symptom, but not as a first cause. The true roots of the modern deviation are anterior to Descartes and the Renaissance. ↩︎
  2. cartésianisme comme expression de l’esprit moderne — Rendered as ‘Cartesianism as expression of the modern spirit’. Guénon does not deny the influence of Descartes, but he reverses the usual relation: it is not Descartes who created the modern spirit; it is the pre‑existing modern spirit that rendered Cartesianism possible and influential. Descartes provided this spirit with a systematic formulation, a ‘clearer consciousness’. But the anti‑traditional tendencies were already at work before him. Cartesianism is a symptom, not a first cause. ↩︎
  3. racines plus lointaines de la déviation — Rendered as ‘more distant roots of the deviation’. Guénon refers to his periodisation: the ‘modern times’ do not begin with the Renaissance (15th-16th century) nor with Descartes (17th century), but with the 14th century. Guénon places the turning point in the crisis of late scholasticism, the birth of nominalism (William of Ockham, c. 1320), and the break with the Thomist synthesis. It was at this moment that faith in the pure intellect began to weaken in the Occident, preparing the ground for the Renaissance and the Reformation. ↩︎
  4. début des temps modernes au XIVe siècle — Rendered as ‘beginning of modern times in the 14th century’. Guénon proposes an original periodisation. Official history places the beginning of modern times at the Renaissance (end of the 15th century) or the Reformation (1517). Guénon moves this date back a century or two: the 14th century saw the collapse of medieval Christendom (the Avignon papacy, the Hundred Years’ War, the Black Death) and especially the emergence of nominalism which, by denying the reality of universals, ruined the possibility of a metaphysics founded on the intellect. The Renaissance and the Reformation are only the late consequences of this already consummated break. ↩︎