¶4 Since we have spoken of philosophy, we shall still point out, without entering into all the details, some of the consequences of individualism in this domain: the first of all was, through the negation of intellectual intuition, to place reason above everything, to make of this purely human and relative faculty the superior part of intelligence, or even to reduce the latter entirely to it; this is what constitutes ‘rationalism’, whose true founder was Descartes.1 This limitation of intelligence was moreover only a first step; reason itself was not long in being more and more lowered to an especially practical role, as applications took precedence over the sciences that could still have a certain speculative character; and, already, Descartes himself was, at bottom, much more preoccupied with these practical applications than with pure science.2 But that is not all: individualism inevitably entails ‘naturalism’, since everything that is beyond nature is thereby beyond the reach of the individual as such; ‘naturalism’ or negation of metaphysics is, moreover, only one and the same thing, and, once intellectual intuition is misunderstood, there is no longer any possible metaphysics; but, while some obstinately build some sort of ‘pseudo‑metaphysics’, others recognise this impossibility more frankly; hence ‘relativism’ in all its forms, whether it be the ‘criticism’ of Kant or the ‘positivism’ of Auguste Comte; and, reason itself being wholly relative and capable of being validly applied only to a likewise relative domain, it is truly true that ‘relativism’ is the only logical outcome of ‘rationalism’.3 This, moreover, was bound to end up by destroying itself: ‘nature’ and ‘becoming’, as we noted above, are in reality synonymous; a ‘naturalism’ consistent with itself can therefore only be one of those ‘philosophies of becoming’ of which we have already spoken, and of which the specifically modern type is ‘evolutionism’; but it is precisely this that was finally to turn against ‘rationalism’, by reproaching reason for being unable adequately to apply itself to what is only change and pure multiplicity, nor to enclose in its concepts the indefinite complexity of sensible things.4 Such is indeed the position taken by that form of ‘evolutionism’ which is Bergsonian ‘intuitionism’, which, of course, is no less individualist and anti‑metaphysical than ‘rationalism’, and which, if it justly criticises the latter, falls even lower by appealing to a properly infra‑rational faculty, to a sensible intuition moreover rather ill‑defined, and more or less mixed with imagination, instinct and sentiment.5 What is very significant is that here there is no longer even any question of ‘truth’, but only of ‘reality’, reduced exclusively to the sensible order alone, and conceived as something essentially moving and unstable; intelligence, with such theories, is truly reduced to its lowest part, and reason itself is no longer admitted except insofar as it applies to shaping matter for industrial uses. After this, only one step remained to be taken: the total negation of intelligence and knowledge, the substitution of ‘utility’ for ‘truth’; this was ‘pragmatism’, to which we have already alluded earlier; and here, we are no longer even in the purely human, as with ‘rationalism’, we are truly in the infra‑human, with the appeal to the ‘subconscious’ which marks the complete reversal of all normal hierarchy.6 This, in its broad outlines, is the course that ‘profane’ philosophy, left to itself and claiming to limit all knowledge to its own horizon, was fatally bound to follow and has effectively followed; as long as a superior knowledge existed, nothing of the kind could occur, for philosophy was at least obliged to respect what it did not know and could not deny it; but when this superior knowledge disappeared, its negation, which corresponded to the state of fact, was soon erected into a theory, and it is from this that all modern philosophy proceeds.7
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Summary

Guénon traces the consequences of individualism in modern philosophy, beginning with Descartes’ rationalism, which negated intellectual intuition and placed purely human reason above everything. This limitation of intelligence was only a first step, as reason was increasingly reduced to a practical role while Descartes himself cared more about practical applications than pure science. Individualism inevitably leads to naturalism (the negation of metaphysics) and then to relativism (Kant’s criticism, Comte’s positivism), which is the only logical outcome of rationalism. Rationalism ultimately destroys itself by turning into philosophies of becoming such as evolutionism, which in turn gave rise to Bergsonian intuitionism—an infra‑rational faculty that falls even lower than rationalism. Finally, pragmatism completes the decline by substituting ‘utility’ for ‘truth’ and appealing to the subconscious, moving from the purely human into the infra‑human. As long as superior knowledge existed, philosophy could not deny what it ignored; but once that knowledge disappeared, its negation was turned into theory, and all modern philosophy proceeds from this.

General notes

  1. rationalisme / Descartes — Rendered as ‘rationalism / Descartes’. Guénon attributes to Descartes (1596-1650) the paternity of modern rationalism: the reduction of all knowledge to what individual reason can attain, and the negation of supra-rational intellectual intuition. The famous ‘cogito ergo sum’ is the starting point of a philosophy that takes the individual ego as the foundation of all certainty, thus reversing the traditional order where the transcendent Principle is the source of all knowledge. Guénon considers Descartes not as an initiator but as a symptom of already advanced decadence. ↩︎
  2. applications pratiques / Descartes — Rendered as ‘practical applications / Descartes’. Guénon alludes to Descartes’s famous phrase in the Discourse on Method (Part Six): to make ourselves ‘masters and possessors of nature’. Descartes did not seek knowledge for its own sake, but for the technical domination of the world. Guénon sees in this the germ of the reduction of science to utility, which would lead to pragmatism. Descartes is thus the father of both modern rationalism and practical materialism. ↩︎
  3. naturalisme / criticisme / positivisme — Rendered as ‘naturalism / criticism / positivism’. Guénon unfolds the logical sequence of rationalism. ‘Naturalism’ reduces all reality to nature (physis), excluding the supernatural or the metaphysical. Kantian ‘criticism’ limits knowledge to phenomena (the ‘noumenon’ is unknowable). Comtean ‘positivism’ rejects as vain all research into first causes. These doctrines are coherent with individualism: if the individual can know only through his reason, and if his reason is limited to the relative, then metaphysics is impossible. Relativism is ‘the only logical outcome’ because it generalises this impossibility to all absolute knowledge. ↩︎
  4. évolutionnisme / rationalisme — Rendered as ‘evolutionism / rationalism’. Guénon notes an internal contradiction of rationalism. Rationalism wants to reduce everything to reason, but evolutionism (Darwin, Spencer, then Bergson) shows that reality is pure change, flux, multiplicity, which reason (which fixes stable concepts) cannot adequately grasp. Evolutionism thus turns against rationalism by criticising the pretensions of reason. But for Guénon, this critique does not restore metaphysics; it falls even lower by appealing to an infra‑rational intuition. ↩︎
  5. intuitionnisme bergsonien — Rendered as ‘Bergsonian intuitionism’. Guénon criticises Bergson (1859-1941) whom he considers a more dangerous adversary than the rationalists because he uses the word ‘intuition’ in a sensible and infra‑rational sense (see earlier remarks on Bergson). Bergson opposes reason and intuition, but his intuition is not the pure intellect; it is an immersion in the flux of temporal consciousness, akin to instinct. Thus Bergson ‘falls even lower’ than Descartes: where Descartes still believed in reason, Bergson no longer even believes in it, and takes refuge in an inferior faculty. ↩︎
  6. pragmatisme / infra-humain / subconscient — Rendered as ‘pragmatism / infra‑human / subconscious’. Guénon sees in pragmatism the final fall: the negation of truth as correspondence to being, replaced by practical utility. It is not even ‘human’ in the sense of reason, but ‘infra‑human’ (that which is below the human: the animal, instinct, the body). The appeal to the ‘subconscious’ (Freud, Jung, but also the philosophies of the unconscious) is a symptom of this descent: knowledge is sought no longer in the intellect, but in the obscure depths of the psyche. This is the ‘complete reversal of all normal hierarchy’: the lowest (the irrational, the instinctive) is placed above the highest (reason, then intellect). ↩︎
  7. marche fatale de la philosophie moderne — Rendered as ‘fatal course of modern philosophy’. Guénon describes the history of Western philosophy as an inevitable degradation once traditional metaphysical knowledge (intellectual intuition) was lost. Rationalism (Descartes) → naturalism and criticism (Kant, Comte) → evolutionism (Bergson) → pragmatism (James, Dewey). Each step is a further fall. Guénon insists on the ‘fatal’ (necessary) character of this sequence: once metaphysics was lost, philosophy could only descend thus, for it no longer had any superior principle to restrain it. All ‘modern philosophy’ proceeds from this original negation. ↩︎