¶2 Individualism implies first of all the negation of intellectual intuition, insofar as the latter is essentially a supra‑individual faculty, and of the order of knowledge that is the proper domain of this intuition, that is to say metaphysics understood in its true sense.1 This is why all that modern philosophers designate by this same name of metaphysics, when they admit something that they call thus, has absolutely nothing in common with true metaphysics: they are only rational constructions or imaginative hypotheses, therefore wholly individual conceptions, and the greater part of which, moreover, relates simply to the ‘physical’ domain, that is to say to nature.2 Even if there occurs in them some question that could be effectively attached to the metaphysical order, the way in which it is envisaged and treated reduces it still to being only ‘pseudo‑metaphysics’, and moreover renders any real and valid solution impossible; it even seems that, for philosophers, it is a matter of posing ‘problems’, even if they be artificial and illusory, much more than of solving them, which is one of the aspects of the disordered need for research for its own sake, that is to say of the vainest agitation in the mental order, as well as in the corporeal order.3 It is also a matter, for these same philosophers, of attaching their name to a ‘system’, that is to say to a strictly bounded and delimited set of theories, and which is indeed their own, which is nothing other than their own work; hence the desire to be original at all costs, even if truth must be sacrificed to this originality: better, for the fame of a philosopher, to invent a new error than to repeat a truth that has already been expressed by others.4 This form of individualism, to which we owe so many ‘systems’ contradictory among themselves, when they are not so in themselves, is moreover to be found just as much among modern scientists and artists; but it is perhaps among philosophers that one can see most clearly the intellectual anarchy that is its inevitable consequence.5
←
→

Summary

Guénon states that individualism begins by denying intellectual intuition, a supra‑individual faculty, along with true metaphysics, its proper domain. What modern philosophers call ‘metaphysics’ bears no relation to genuine metaphysics, consisting instead of rational constructions or imaginative hypotheses that are merely individual conceptions and largely belong to the physical domain of nature. Even when metaphysical questions arise, the way they are treated reduces them to pseudo‑metaphysics and prevents any real solution, as philosophers seem more concerned with posing artificial problems than solving them. They also seek to attach their name to an original ‘system’, valuing novelty over truth, to the point that inventing a new error is preferred to repeating an existing truth. This individualistic form, responsible for countless contradictory systems, appears equally among scientists and artists, but intellectual anarchy is most visible among philosophers as its inevitable consequence.

General notes

  1. intuition intellectuelle / métaphysique véritable — Rendered as ‘intellectual intuition / true metaphysics’. Guénon recalls that intellectual intuition is the faculty of the pure intellect, which surpasses the individual (it is ‘supra‑individual’). True metaphysics is the knowledge of transcendent principles obtained by this intuition. Individualism, by denying all supra‑individual reality, thereby denies the very possibility of metaphysics. Modern pseudo‑metaphysics are only rational or imaginative constructions, without real scope. ↩︎
  2. pseudo-métaphysique — Rendered as ‘pseudo‑metaphysics’. Guénon denounces modern philosophies (from Descartes to Heidegger, passing through Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche) as counterfeits of metaphysics. They are ‘pseudo’ because they never surpass the level of discursive reason or imagination. Their content is often physical (cosmological) or psychological, disguised as metaphysics. True metaphysics, which is the knowledge of the Absolute, is totally foreign to them. ↩︎
  3. poser des problèmes / agitation mentale — Rendered as ‘posing problems / mental agitation’. Guénon characterises modern philosophy as an autotelic activity: it poses problems for the pleasure of posing them, not with the intention of solving them. The problems are often ‘artificial and illusory’, born of confusions of language or false premises. This mental agitation is the equivalent, in the intellectual order, of the physical agitation that Guénon described earlier (the quest for movement for its own sake). It is a sterile dispersion. ↩︎
  4. système / originalité — Rendered as ‘system / originality’. Guénon criticises the philosophical fashion of ‘originality’. In tradition, truth is one and immutable; to repeat truth is not a defect but a merit. The modern philosopher, on the contrary, wants a ‘system’ that is his own, even if it is false. Originality becomes a supreme value, superior even to truth. This attitude is typically individualistic: it privileges the philosopher’s ego over the object of knowledge. The history of modern philosophy is thus a succession of contradictory systems, each seeking to distinguish itself from the preceding one. ↩︎
  5. anarchie intellectuelle — Rendered as ‘intellectual anarchy’. Guénon uses the term ‘anarchy’ (absence of principle, of rule, of hierarchy) to characterise the state of modern thought. Philosophical systems contradict each other, none is recognised as a universal authority, and each proclaims itself original. This is the exact opposite of tradition, where doctrine is one, stable and transmitted by a spiritual authority. Intellectual anarchy is the direct consequence of individualism: when each makes his own truth, truth ceases to exist. ↩︎