¶7 Since we have come to speak of ‘experimentalism’, we must take advantage of it to answer a question that may arise on this subject, namely: why have the properly experimental sciences received, in modern civilisation, a development that they have never had in other civilisations? It is because these sciences are those of the sensible world, those of matter, and also because they are those that give rise to the most immediate practical applications; their development, accompanied by what we would willingly call the ‘superstition of the fact’, thus corresponds well to specifically modern tendencies, whereas, on the contrary, previous epochs could not find in them sufficient motives of interest to attach themselves to them thus to the point of neglecting knowledge of a superior order.1 It must be well understood that it is not at all a question, in our thought, of declaring illegitimate in itself any knowledge whatsoever, even an inferior one; what is illegitimate is only the abuse that occurs when things of this kind absorb all human activity, as we see at present.2 One could even conceive that, in a normal civilisation, sciences constituted by an experimental method might be, as well as others, attached to principles and thus provided with a real speculative value; in fact, if this case does not seem to have presented itself, it is because attention was turned preferably to another side, and also because, even when it was a question of studying the sensible world to the extent that it might seem interesting to do so, traditional data made it possible to undertake this study more favourably by other methods and from another point of view.3
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Summary

Guénon addresses why the experimental sciences have developed in modern civilisation as never before. He explains that these sciences, belonging to the sensible world and to matter, are those that yield the most immediate practical applications, which corresponds to specifically modern tendencies, whereas earlier epochs did not find sufficient reason in them to neglect higher knowledge. He clarifies that he does not consider inferior knowledge illegitimate in itself, but only the abuse that occurs when such things absorb all human activity. Guénon adds that in a normal civilisation, experimental sciences could in principle be attached to principles and possess real speculative value, but this has not occurred because attention was directed elsewhere and because traditional data allowed the study of the sensible world by other methods and from another point of view.

General notes

  1. superstition du fait — Rendered as ‘superstition of the fact’. Guénon coins this expression to designate the modern attitude which consists of treating the ‘brute fact’ (sensible observation) as a source of absolute certainty, even as the only source of valid knowledge. This ‘superstition’ is the reverse side of materialism: one believes that facts ‘speak for themselves’, whereas they mean nothing without a theoretical interpretation. Guénon sees in it an inversion of hierarchy: in tradition, the principle (intelligible) prevails over the fact (sensible); in modernity, the fact is erected into the supreme judge. ↩︎
  2. abus légitime / illégitime — Rendered as ‘legitimate / illegitimate abuse’. Guénon distinguishes the legitimate use of an inferior science (its modest development, subordinated to superior ends) from its abusive use (when it becomes exclusive and invades the whole field of human activity). Experimentalism in itself is not condemnable; what is condemnable is that it has taken the place of metaphysics and contemplation, and that it claims an autonomy that renders it blind to its own limits. The Guénonian critique is not a rejection of science, but a restoration of hierarchy. ↩︎
  3. autres méthodes / autre point de vue — Rendered as ‘other methods / other point of view’. Guénon concedes that the study of the sensible world is not forbidden in a traditional civilisation, but it is done by other paths: not by controlled experimentation and quantitative measurement, but by analogy, symbolism, deduction from principles. For example, one can know the properties of metals by the theory of cosmic correspondences (planets, humours), without having to dissolve them in acids. These ‘other methods’ are faster and surer for attaining a qualitative and speculative knowledge of the sensible. Modernity chose the long path (experimentation) because it had lost access to the principles that made the other methods possible. ↩︎