¶6 Science, in constituting itself in the modern way, has lost not only in depth, but also, one might say, in solidity, for attachment to principles made it participate in the immutability of those principles to the full extent that its very object allowed, whereas, enclosed exclusively in the world of change, it finds there no longer anything stable, no fixed point on which it can lean; no longer starting from any absolute certainty, it is reduced to probabilities and approximations, or to purely hypothetical constructions that are only the work of individual fancy.1 Thus, even if it accidentally happens that modern science arrives, by a very circuitous path, at certain results that seem to agree with some data of the ancient ‘traditional sciences’, one would be quite wrong to see in this a confirmation of which those data have no need at all; and it would be a waste of time to wish to reconcile totally different points of view, or to establish a concordance with hypothetical theories which, perhaps, will be found entirely discredited in a few years’ time.2 The things in question cannot, for current science, belong to any but the domain of hypotheses, whereas for the ‘traditional sciences’ they were something quite different and presented themselves as indubitable consequences of truths known intuitively, therefore infallibly, in the metaphysical order.3 Moreover, it is a singular illusion, proper to modern ‘experimentalism’, to believe that a theory can be proved by facts, when, in reality, the same facts can always be equally explained by several different theories, and when certain of the promoters of the experimental method, such as Claude Bernard, have themselves recognised that they could only interpret them with the aid of ‘preconceived ideas’, without which these facts would remain ‘brute facts’, devoid of all signification and all scientific value.4
Summary
Guénon argues that modern science has lost not only in depth but also in solidity, since attachment to principles once allowed science to participate in their immutability, whereas now, enclosed in the world of change, it finds nothing stable or fixed to lean on. He states that without any absolute certainty, modern science is reduced to probabilities, approximations, or hypothetical constructions that are merely the work of individual fancy. Guénon warns against trying to reconcile modern and traditional viewpoints, because what is only hypothesis for current science was for traditional sciences an indubitable consequence of truths known intuitively in the metaphysical order. He also criticises the modern illusion that a theory can be proved by facts, noting that the same facts can always be explained by several theories, and that even proponents of the experimental method admitted they needed ‘preconceived ideas’ to interpret facts, which otherwise remain brute facts devoid of scientific value.
General notes
- probabilités / approximations / hypothèses — Rendered as ‘probabilities / approximations / hypotheses’. Guénon characterises modern science by the absence of certainty. Quantum physics and statistical thermodynamics are founded on probabilities; measurements are always subject to errors (approximations); theoretical models (relativity, string theory, etc.) are revisable hypothetical constructions. For Guénon, this absence of absolute foundation is a debasement: true (traditional) science proceeds from certain and immutable principles, and descends by deduction towards the contingent, thus retaining a relative but real certainty. ‘Individual fancy’ designates the excessive role of the researcher’s imagination in the elaboration of modern theories. ↩︎
- concordance illusoire — Rendered as ‘illusory concordance’. Guénon warns against a frequent error among certain traditionalists or ‘conspiracists’: wanting to find in modern science ‘confirmations’ of traditional doctrines (for example, quantum physics ‘proving’ Vedānta). For Guénon, these concordances are superficial and temporary (modern theories change; traditional truths are immutable). Traditional knowledge needs no external confirmation, and to attempt to ‘reconcile’ the two points of view is to lower tradition to the level of a scientific hypothesis. It is an illusion typical of modern ‘experimentalism’ to believe that a theory is ‘proved’ by facts. ↩︎
- conséquences indubitables — Rendered as ‘indubitable consequences’. Guénon recalls the deductive method of the traditional sciences. From certain metaphysical principles (known by intellectual intuition), the traditional sciences draw consequences that are true not by empirical verification but by their conformity to the principles. These consequences have the same degree of certainty as the principles, to the extent that the deduction is correct. This is why Guénon can say that they are ‘indubitable’ (doubt impossible), whereas the hypotheses of modern science are always revisable. ↩︎
- Claude Bernard / idées préconçues — Rendered as ‘Claude Bernard / preconceived ideas’. Claude Bernard (1813‑1878), French physiologist, founder of experimental medicine. Guénon cites Bernard against the excesses of empiricism. Bernard wrote that ‘the brute fact is nothing’ and that it is the ‘preconceived idea’ (the theoretical hypothesis) that gives meaning to facts. Guénon uses this authority to show that modern science, even within its own paradigm, cannot do without a non‑empirical element (the hypothesis). But this element, being conjectural, cannot ground a certainty. Modern experimentalism therefore rests on a contradiction: it claims to ground everything on experience, but it needs ‘ideas’ that do not come from experience. ↩︎
Guénon’s footnotes
- perhaps, will be found entirely discredited in a few years’ time — The same observation holds, from a religious point of view, with regard to a certain “apologetics” which claims to come to an agreement with the results of modern science — a perfectly illusory task, always needing to be redone, which moreover presents the serious danger of seeming to link religion with changing and ephemeral conceptions, from which it must remain completely independent.
- therefore infallibly, in the metaphysical order — It would be easy to give examples here; we will cite only one of the most striking: the difference in character between the conceptions concerning ether in Hindu cosmology and in modern physics.