¶3 A few examples will not be useless in order to make clearer what is in question; and, first of all, we shall take an example of very wide scope, that of ‘physics’ as understood by the ancients and by the moderns; moreover, in this case, there is no need at all to leave the Occidental world to see the profound difference that separates the two conceptions.1 The term ‘physics’, in its primary and etymological acceptation, means nothing other than ‘science of nature’, without any restriction; it is therefore the science that concerns the most general laws of ‘becoming’, for ‘nature’ and ‘becoming’ are at bottom synonymous, and it is indeed thus that the Greeks understood it, notably Aristotle; if there exist more particular sciences relating to the same order, they are then only ‘specifications’ of physics for one or another more narrowly determined domain.2 There is therefore already something rather significant in the deviation that the moderns have inflicted on this word ‘physics’ by employing it to designate exclusively one particular science among other sciences which, all, are equally sciences of nature; this fact attaches to the fragmentation that we have already pointed out as one of the characters of modern science, to that ‘specialisation’ engendered by the analytical spirit, and pushed to the point of rendering truly inconceivable, for those who undergo its influence, a science bearing on nature considered in its totality.3 It has not gone unnoticed rather often that there are some disadvantages of this ‘specialisation’, and especially the narrowness of view that is an inevitable consequence of it; but it seems that even those who realised this most clearly have nevertheless resigned themselves to regarding it as a necessary evil, on account of the accumulation of detailed knowledge that no man could embrace at a single glance; they have not understood, on the one hand, that this detailed knowledge is insignificant in itself and does not deserve that one sacrifice to it a synthetic knowledge which, even while still confined to the relative, is of a much higher order, and, on the other hand, that the impossibility in which one finds oneself of unifying their multiplicity arises only from the fact that one has forbidden oneself to attach them to a superior principle, from the fact that one has obstinately proceeded from below and from the exterior, when one would have had to do exactly the contrary in order to have a science possessing a real speculative value.4
Summary
Guénon uses the example of physics to illustrate the profound difference between the ancient and modern conceptions of science. He explains that for the Greeks, particularly Aristotle, physics meant the science of nature as a whole, concerning the most general laws of becoming, with more specific sciences being mere specifications of this general physics. Guénon notes that the moderns have significantly deviated from this meaning by using ‘physics’ to designate only one particular science among many, reflecting the fragmentation and specialisation driven by the analytical spirit. He observes that while some have recognised the drawbacks of specialisation, especially narrowness of view, they have resigned themselves to it as a necessary evil due to the accumulation of detailed knowledge. Guénon criticises this position, arguing that such detailed knowledge is insignificant in itself and not worth sacrificing synthetic knowledge, and that the inability to unify multiplicity stems from refusing to attach details to a superior principle and from proceeding from below rather than from above.
General notes
- physique des anciens / physique des modernes — Rendered as ‘physics of the ancients / physics of the moderns’. Guénon uses the same term ‘physics’ to designate two radically different disciplines. Ancient physics (that of Aristotle, the Stoics, the Scholastics) is a qualitative, synthetic and teleological science, which studies the principles of change in nature as a participation in the intelligible order. Modern physics (that of Galileo, Newton, Laplace) is quantitative, analytical and mechanistic, reduced to the measurement of observable phenomena. Guénon chooses this example from within Occidental civilisation itself to show that the rupture is not between ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’, but between tradition (ancient and medieval) and anti‑tradition (modern). ↩︎
- science de la nature — Rendered as ‘science of nature’. Guénon recalls the Greek etymology: physis (nature) derives from phyein (to produce, to bring forth). Aristotelian physics is the science of movement and change considered in their generality, not the mechanics of solid bodies. It includes what we would today call biology, psychology (studied as ‘science of the soul’, peri psychēs) and even part of cosmology. This science is ‘qualitative’ because it studies essences and finalities, not measurable magnitudes alone. ↩︎
- spécialisation / fragmentation — Rendered as ‘specialisation / fragmentation’. Guénon denounces the indefinite division of sciences into narrower and narrower disciplines. ‘Specialisation’ is the effect of the analytical spirit (dissection of the real into isolated parts) and the forgetting of synthesis. In modern science, no one any longer can have an overall view of nature, for each specialist shut up in his own small domain is ignorant of all the others. This fragmentation is the exact opposite of traditional science, which always starts from the universal to descend to the particular, while maintaining a unified vision of the whole. ↩︎
- procéder par en bas / par le haut — Rendered as ‘proceed from below / from above’. Guénon opposes two fundamental methods. The method ‘from below’ (modern) starts from particular facts, accumulates empirical data, and attempts to ascend to general laws by induction. This method can never attain a true universality, because it remains a prisoner of the contingent. The method ‘from above’ (traditional) starts from universal principles and descends by deduction to particular phenomena. This method alone can produce a ‘speculative’ science (that is to say, contemplative, founded on theoria), because it relates each phenomenon to its transcendent cause. ↩︎