¶2 There are therefore, with respect to the sciences, two radically different and even mutually incompatible conceptions, which we may call the traditional conception and the modern conception; we have often had occasion to allude to those ‘traditional sciences’ that existed in antiquity and the Middle Ages, that still exist in the Orient, but of which the very idea is totally foreign to Occidentals of our day.1 It must be added that each civilisation has had ‘traditional sciences’ of a particular type, belonging to it in its own right, for here we are no longer in the order of universal principles, to which pure metaphysics alone relates, but in the order of adaptations, where, by the very fact that it is a question of a contingent domain, account must be taken of the whole set of conditions, mental and other, which are those of a given people, and we would even say of a given period of that people’s existence, since we have seen above that there are epochs when ‘readaptations’ become necessary.2 These ‘readaptations’ are only changes of form, which in no way touch the essence of tradition itself; for the metaphysical doctrine, only the expression can be modified, in a way that is quite comparable to translation from one language into another; whatever the forms with which it clothes itself in order to express itself insofar as this is possible, there is absolutely only one metaphysics, just as there is only one truth.3 But, when one passes to applications, the case is naturally different: with the sciences, as with social institutions, we are in the world of form and multiplicity; this is why one can say that other forms truly constitute other sciences, even if they have, at least partially, the same object.4 Logicians are accustomed to regard a science as entirely defined by its object, which is inaccurate by excess of simplification; the point of view under which this object is envisaged must also enter into the definition of the science.5 There is an indefinite multitude of possible sciences; it can happen that several sciences study the same things, but under aspects so different, therefore by methods and with intentions so different also, that they are none the less really distinct sciences. This case can, in particular, present itself for the ‘traditional sciences’ of diverse civilisations, which, although comparable among themselves, are not however always assimilable one to another, and often could only be abusively designated by the same names.6 The difference is still much more considerable, it goes without saying, if, instead of establishing a comparison between ‘traditional sciences’, which at least all have the same fundamental character, one wishes to compare these sciences, in a general way, with the sciences as moderns conceive them; at first glance, it can sometimes seem that the object is the same on both sides, and yet the knowledge that the two kinds of science respectively give of this object is so different, that one hesitates, after more ample examination, to affirm identity still, even in only a certain respect.7
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Summary

Guénon identifies two radically different and incompatible conceptions of the sciences: the traditional conception (found in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and still in the Orient) and the modern conception, which is entirely foreign to Occidentals today. He explains that each civilisation has its own ‘traditional sciences’ adapted to its particular mental and other conditions, with ‘readaptations’ occurring over time that change only the form, not the essence, of tradition. Guénon stresses that while pure metaphysics is one and universal, sciences belong to the world of form and multiplicity, so different forms truly constitute different sciences even when they share the same object. He adds that comparing traditional sciences with modern sciences is even more difficult, because even when the object appears the same, the knowledge provided by each is so different that one can no longer affirm their identity.

General notes

  1. sciences traditionnelles — Rendered as ‘traditional sciences’. Guénon uses this term to designate the whole body of disciplines which, in a traditional civilisation, are conceived as applications of metaphysics to contingent domains. Examples include astrology (the science of celestial influences in correspondence with principles), alchemy (the science of transmutation understood as a symbol of spiritual transformation), geomancy, sacred medicine, cosmic music, etc. These sciences are not ‘empirical’ in the modern sense; they proceed by deduction from metaphysical principles and are essentially symbolic. Their idea is ‘foreign’ to moderns because the latter, having lost all consciousness of the hierarchy of knowledge, cannot conceive that a science could be anything other than an accumulation of observable facts. ↩︎
  2. adaptations / réadaptations — Rendered as ‘adaptations / readaptations’. Pure metaphysical doctrine being universal and immutable, its external expression (languages, symbols, rites, institutions) must be ‘adapted’ to the mental, social and cosmic conditions of each civilisation and each epoch. A ‘readaptation’ is a formal change rendered necessary by cyclic evolution (for example, the passage from a Golden Age to an Iron Age, or the progressive decadence of the Kali Yuga). These adaptations change nothing in the substance, but modify its envelope. Prophets, founders of religions or initiatic reformers are precisely those who operate these readaptations. ↩︎
  3. une métaphysique / une vérité — Rendered as ‘one metaphysics / one truth’. Guénon here states the fundamental principle of the sophia perennis: metaphysical Truth is one, even though its expressions vary according to civilisations and languages. This uniqueness is not uniformity: each tradition expresses the same truth from an angle, a symbolism and a terminology that are its own. But these formal differences must not mask the identity of substance. This is why Guénon can speak of ‘metaphysics’ (in the singular) of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam as one and the same science of principles. ↩︎
  4. même objet / formes différentes — Rendered as ‘same object / different forms’. Guénon here distinguishes the material object (the ‘what’ of the study) from the form or point of view (the ‘how’). Two sciences can study the same phenomenon (for example, celestial movements): modern astronomy will do so quantitatively, mechanically, without reference to principles; traditional astrology will do so qualitatively, symbolically, relating each celestial body to a cosmic or spiritual function. The ‘material’ object is the same; the science is radically different. This is why Guénon affirms that ‘other forms truly constitute other sciences’. ↩︎
  5. point de vue — Rendered as ‘point of view’. Guénon here rehabilitates the Scholastic notion of formalitas or ratio formalis. Science is defined not only by its material object, but by the angle under which it envisages it. This idea is capital for understanding the legitimacy of ‘traditional sciences’: they are not ‘bad sciences’ (empirically false), but different sciences, operating on another plane of reality. The point of view determines the method, the principles and the finality of the science. ↩︎
  6. assimilables / mêmes noms — Rendered as ‘assimilable / same names’. Guénon warns against false terminological equivalences between traditions. What India calls jyotiṣa (astrology) is not identical to what ancient Egypt called by a corresponding term, although both are ‘traditional sciences’. Each tradition develops its own symbols and methods, adapted to its particular genius. To compare them as strictly identical (by translating them with the same Western name) is an abuse. However, they are ‘comparable’: one can study them in parallel because they proceed from the same traditional spirit. ↩︎
  7. objet / connaissance autre — Rendered as ‘object / knowledge different’. The radical difference between traditional science and modern science is not only formal but touches the very nature of the ‘knowledge’ obtained. Modern science, even when it studies the same material phenomenon, produces a quantitative, utilitarian knowledge devoid of metaphysical meaning. Traditional science produces a qualitative, symbolic knowledge, which relates the phenomenon to its transcendent principle. One could say that the former is horizontal knowledge (from phenomenon to phenomenon), the latter vertical knowledge (from phenomenon to Principle). Guénon suggests that after thorough examination, one may doubt whether there is even ‘identity’ of object, for the object itself is not the same depending on whether it is perceived in its sensible dimension alone or in its symbolic and principial dimension. ↩︎