¶14 Any science, we say, can take on this character, whatever its object, on the sole condition of being constituted and envisaged according to the traditional spirit; one must only take account in this of the degrees of importance of these sciences, according to the hierarchical rank of the diverse realities to which they relate; but, at one degree or another, their character and their function are essentially the same in the traditional conception.1 What is true here of any science is likewise true of any art, insofar as the latter can have a properly symbolic value that renders it apt to furnish ‘supports’ for meditation, and also insofar as its rules are, like the laws whose knowledge is the object of the sciences, reflections and applications of the fundamental principles; and thus, in every normal civilisation, there are ‘traditional arts’, no less unknown to modern Occidentals than the ‘traditional sciences’.2 The truth is that there does not exist in reality a ‘profane domain’, which would oppose itself in a certain way to the ‘sacred domain’; there exists only a ‘profane point of view’, which is properly nothing other than the point of view of ignorance.3 This is why ‘profane science’, that of the moderns, can rightly, as we have already said elsewhere, be regarded as an ‘ignorant knowledge’: a knowledge of an inferior order, which holds itself entirely at the level of the lowest reality, and a knowledge ignorant of everything that surpasses it, ignorant of every end superior to itself, as of every principle that could assure it a legitimate place, however humble, among the diverse orders of integral knowledge; irremediably enclosed in the relative and limited domain where it wished to proclaim itself independent, having thus itself cut off all communication with transcendent truth and with supreme knowledge, it is no longer anything but a vain and illusory science, which, truth to tell, comes from nothing and leads to nothing.4
Summary
Guénon states that any science can take on a sacred character if constituted according to the traditional spirit, with degrees of importance corresponding to the hierarchical rank of the realities it concerns. He extends this to any art, insofar as it has symbolic value and can furnish supports for meditation, noting that normal civilisations possess ‘traditional arts’ as unknown to modern Occidentals as the traditional sciences. Guénon argues that there is no real ‘profane domain’, only a ‘profane point of view’ which is nothing other than the point of view of ignorance. He therefore characterises modern ‘profane science’ as ‘ignorant knowledge’: a knowledge of the lowest order, ignorant of everything that surpasses it, enclosed in a relative and limited domain where it proclaimed itself independent, having cut all communication with transcendent truth, and becoming a vain and illusory science that comes from nothing and leads to nothing.
General notes
- degrés d’importance — Rendered as ‘degrees of importance’. All traditional sciences participate in the same spirit, but they do not have the same ontological dignity. Pure metaphysics is the highest, then come the cosmological sciences (astrology, alchemy), then the sciences concerning the human world (medicine, traditional psychology), and finally the sciences of the technical arts. Each has its place in a hierarchy, but all are ‘sacred’ because they proceed from the principles and lead back to them analogically. Modernity, by levelling these degrees or suppressing them, destroys hierarchy and therefore science itself. ↩︎
- arts traditionnels — Rendered as ‘traditional arts’. Guénon extends the principle of sacred sciences to the traditional arts (sacred architecture, iconography, liturgical chant, calligraphy, etc.). A traditional art is not a subjective expression of the artist, but the application of symbolic rules derived from metaphysical principles. The plan of a Gothic cathedral, for example, is a sacred geometrical figure. Traditional arts furnish ‘supports’ (sensible forms) for meditation and spiritual elevation. Like the traditional sciences, they are unknown to moderns, who see in art only an individual expression or a decorative technique. ↩︎
- domaine profane / point de vue profane — Rendered as ‘profane domain / profane point of view’. A capital distinction: the ‘profane domain’ (a region of reality that would be essentially foreign to the sacred) does not exist. Every reality, even the most material, can be envisaged either from a sacred point of view (as a symbol and reflection of principles) or from a profane point of view (as an autonomous object, separated from its Principle). The profane is therefore not a region of being, but a mode of regard, an ignorance of the transcendent dimension of things. Modernity has erected this ignorant point of view into a universal norm. ↩︎
- savoir ignorant — Rendered as ‘ignorant knowledge’. Guénon forges this oxymoronic expression to characterise modern science. It is a ‘knowledge’ (in the sense that it accumulates factual and technical knowledge) but it is ‘ignorant’ (in the sense that it deliberately ignores metaphysical principles and the supreme end of man). This knowledge is ‘vain’ (without spiritual fruit) and ‘illusory’ (because it takes the relative for the absolute). It ‘comes from nothing’ (because it cuts itself off from its own principles) and ‘leads to nothing’ (because it has no transcendent finality). This is the most severe condemnation that Guénon pronounces against modernity. ↩︎
Guénon’s footnotes
- no less unknown to modern Occidentals than the ‘traditional sciences’ — The art of the builders of the Middle Ages can be mentioned as a particularly remarkable example of these “traditional arts”, the practice of which moreover implied the real knowledge of the corresponding sciences.
- which is properly nothing other than the point of view of ignorance — To convince oneself of this, it suffices to observe facts such as the following: one of the most “sacred” sciences, cosmogony, which has its place as such in all the inspired Books, including the Hebrew Bible, has become, for the moderns, the object of the most purely “profane” hypotheses; the domain of science is the same in both cases, but the point of view is totally different.