¶12 Any science whatsoever, according to the traditional conception, has less its interest in itself than in what it is as an extension or a secondary branch of the doctrine, whose essential part is constituted, as we have said, by pure metaphysics.1 Indeed, if any science is assuredly legitimate, provided that it occupies only the place that really suits it by reason of its own nature, it is nevertheless easy to understand that, for anyone who possesses a knowledge of a superior order, inferior knowledges necessarily lose much of their interest, and that they even retain it only as a function, so to speak, of principial knowledge, that is to say to the extent that, on the one hand, they reflect the latter in one or another contingent domain, and that, on the other hand, they are capable of leading towards this same principial knowledge, which, in the case we are considering, can never be lost sight of nor sacrificed to more or less accidental considerations.2 These are the two complementary roles that belong properly to the ‘traditional sciences’: on the one hand, as applications of the doctrine, they make it possible to link together all the orders of reality, to integrate them into the unity of the total synthesis; on the other hand, they are, for some at least, and in conformity with their aptitudes, a preparation for a higher knowledge, a sort of advance towards the latter, and, in their hierarchical distribution according to the degrees of existence to which they relate, they then constitute as many rungs by means of which it is possible to rise to pure intellectuality.3 It is only too evident that modern sciences cannot, to any degree, fulfil either of these two roles; this is why they are and can only be ‘profane science’, whereas the ‘traditional sciences’, by their attachment to metaphysical principles, are effectively incorporated into ‘sacred science’.4
Summary
Guénon explains that according to the traditional conception, a science has less interest in itself than as an extension or secondary branch of the doctrine, whose essential part is pure metaphysics. He notes that for anyone possessing superior knowledge, inferior knowledges lose much of their interest and retain it only as a function of principial knowledge: on the one hand by reflecting it in contingent domains, and on the other by leading towards that same principial knowledge. Guénon assigns two complementary roles to the ‘traditional sciences’: as applications of the doctrine, they link together all orders of reality within the unity of total synthesis; and as a preparation for higher knowledge, they constitute rungs by which one can rise to pure intellectuality. He concludes that modern sciences cannot fulfil either role, and are therefore only ‘profane science’, whereas traditional sciences, through their attachment to metaphysical principles, are incorporated into ‘sacred science’.
General notes
- branche secondaire de la doctrine — Rendered as ‘secondary branch of the doctrine’. Guénon compares metaphysics (knowledge of principles) to a tree trunk, and the particular sciences to secondary branches. A branch does not have its reason for being in itself, but insofar as it extends the trunk and participates in the life of the whole. Likewise, a traditional science is valuable only by virtue of its attachment to metaphysics, which is the ‘essential’ (that which constitutes the being of the tree). Pure metaphysics is the principal object; the sciences are secondary, subordinated objects. ↩︎
- intérêt / fonction de la connaissance principielle — Rendered as ‘interest / function of principial knowledge’. Guénon distinguishes relative value from absolute value. An inferior science (for example biology) has a certain relative value (it is ‘legitimate’ in its domain). But for one who possesses metaphysics, this relative value loses almost all interest, for it brings nothing new at the level of principles. It retains interest only ‘as a function’ of principial knowledge: either because it is a reflection of it (an aspect by which it can recall superior truths), or because it serves as a preparation (a rung upwards). Without this, it becomes a distraction or a waste of time. ↩︎
- échelons vers l’intellectualité pure — Rendered as ‘rungs towards pure intellectuality’. Guénon expounds traditional pedagogy. The inferior sciences (cosmological, mathematical, symbolic) are not only reflections of principles; they can serve as a propadeutic (preparation) to metaphysics. The study of the order of the world (cosmos) can dispose the soul to the contemplation of transcendent principles. This doctrine is found in Plato (Republic, Book VII: mathematics as a preparation for dialectic), in Pythagoreanism, in Neoplatonism, and in Scholasticism (the liberal arts as trivium and quadrivium leading to first philosophy). The ‘degrees of existence’ are the ontological levels (matter, soul, intellect). ↩︎
- science profane / science sacrée — Rendered as ‘profane science / sacred science’. Guénon opposes two types of science. Sacred science (any traditional science) is a knowledge that relates each phenomenon to its transcendent principle, and thus participates in the sacred character of the cosmic and metaphysical order. Profane science (modern) is a knowledge that ignores or denies principles, and treats phenomena as if they were autonomous and ultimate. The term ‘profane’ (Latin profanus, ‘in front of the temple’) originally designates what is outside the sacred place. Guénon uses it to signify that modern science is excluded from the order of true knowledge, that it stands outside the temple of wisdom. ↩︎
Guénon’s footnotes
- as we have said, by pure metaphysics — This is expressed, for example, by a designation such as that of upaveda, applied in India to certain “traditional sciences” and indicating their subordination with respect to the Veda, that is to say, to sacred knowledge par excellence.
- they then constitute as many rungs by means of which it is possible to rise to pure intellectuality — In our study The Esoterism of Dante, we indicated the symbolism of the ladder, of which, according to various traditions, the rungs correspond to certain sciences at the same time as to states of being, which necessarily implies that these sciences, instead of being considered in a completely “profane” manner as with the moderns, gave rise to a transposition conferring upon them a truly “initiatic” scope.