¶1 We have just said that, in civilisations that possess the traditional character, intellectual intuition is at the principle of everything; in other words, it is the pure metaphysical doctrine that constitutes the essential, and everything else attaches itself to it as consequences or applications to the various orders of contingent realities.1 This is so notably for social institutions; and, on the other hand, the same thing is also true with respect to the sciences, that is to say, the kinds of knowledge relating to the domain of the relative, which, in such civilisations, can only be envisaged as simple dependencies and, in a way, as extensions or reflections of absolute and principial knowledge.2 Thus, the true hierarchy is everywhere and always observed: the relative is not held to be non‑existent, which would be absurd; it is taken into consideration to the extent that it deserves to be, but it is put in its just place, which can only be a secondary and subordinate place; and, within this relative itself, there are very diverse degrees, according to whether it concerns things more or less distant from the domain of principles.3
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Summary

Guénon explains that in traditional civilisations, intellectual intuition is the principle of everything, with pure metaphysical doctrine constituting the essential, while everything else attaches itself to it as consequences or applications to contingent realities. He notes that this applies to social institutions as well as to the sciences, which are envisaged only as dependencies, extensions, or reflections of absolute and principial knowledge. Guénon emphasises that the true hierarchy is always observed: the relative is not denied existence but is given its just, secondary, and subordinate place, with diverse degrees according to how close or distant things are from the domain of principles.

General notes

  1. conséquences ou applications — Rendered as ‘consequences or applications’. These two terms designate the two principal modes by which pure metaphysical doctrine unfolds into the contingent domains. ‘Consequences’ are logical deductions from principles (for example, the laws of social hierarchy derived from the nature of castes). ‘Applications’ are the practical implementation of these principles in particular conditions (for example, rites or technical rules). In both cases, nothing is added that is not already virtually contained in principial knowledge. ↩︎
  2. prolongements ou des reflets — Rendered as ‘extensions or reflections’. The metaphor of ‘reflection’ implies that relative knowledge has no light of its own; it receives all its intelligibility from principial knowledge, as the Moon receives its light from the Sun. ‘Extension’ suggests an ontological continuity: there is no rupture between the metaphysical and the physical, but a continuous gradation. Guénon thus opposes both Cartesian dualism (radical separation between res cogitans and res extensa) and materialism (reduction of the superior to the inferior). ↩︎
  3. degrés fort divers — Rendered as ‘very diverse degrees’. Guénon here introduces an essential notion: hierarchisation within the contingent itself. For example, geometry and celestial mechanics are ‘less distant’ from principles than chemistry or biology, for they participate more in the intelligible and mathematical order. Sociology or economics, which deal with the lowest human actions, are ‘more distant’. This gradation makes it possible to evaluate the relative dignity of the sciences without ever losing sight of their common subordination to metaphysics. ↩︎