¶9 In any case, one experiences very generally the impression that there is no longer, in the present state, any stability; but, while a few feel the danger and try to react, most of our contemporaries take pleasure in this disorder, in which they see something like an externalised image of their own mentality.1 There is, indeed, an exact correspondence between a world where everything seems to be in pure ‘becoming’, where there is no longer any place for the immutable and the permanent, and the state of mind of men who make all reality consist in this same ‘becoming’, which implies the negation of true knowledge, as well as of the very object of this knowledge, by which we mean transcendent and universal principles.2 One can even go further: it is the negation of all real knowledge, in whatever order it may be, even in the relative, since, as we indicated above, the relative is unintelligible and impossible without the absolute, the contingent without the necessary, change without the immutable, multiplicity without unity; ‘relativism’ contains a contradiction within itself, and, when one wants to reduce everything to change, one should logically arrive at denying the very existence of change; at bottom, the famous arguments of Zeno of Elea had no other meaning.3 One must say, indeed, that theories of the kind in question are not exclusively proper to modern times, for one must not exaggerate; one can find a few examples in Greek philosophy, and the case of Heraclitus, with his ‘universal flux’, is the best known in this regard; it is even what led the Eleatics to combat these conceptions, as well as those of the atomists, by a sort of reductio ad absurdum.4 In India itself, something comparable has occurred, but, of course, from another point of view than that of philosophy; certain Buddhist schools, indeed, also presented the same character, for one of their principal theses was that of the ‘dissolubility of all things’.5 Only, these theories were then only exceptions, and such revolts against the traditional spirit, which could have occurred during the entire course of the Kali Yuga, had in sum only a fairly limited scope; what is new is the generalisation of such conceptions, such as we observe in the contemporary Occident.6
Summary
Guénon observes that in the present state, there is a widespread impression of no stability, and while a few feel the danger and try to react, most contemporaries take pleasure in this disorder as an externalised image of their own mentality. He sees an exact correspondence between a world reduced to pure ‘becoming’ and a state of mind that denies true knowledge as well as transcendent and universal principles. Guénon argues that relativism is self-contradictory, since the relative is unintelligible without the absolute, change without the immutable, and multiplicity without unity; pushing the logic of change to its conclusion would even deny change itself, as Zeno’s arguments showed. He acknowledges that similar theories existed in Greek philosophy (Heraclitus) and in certain Buddhist schools, but these were only exceptions with limited scope. What is new, according to Guénon, is the generalisation of such conceptions in the contemporary Occident.
General notes
- image extériorisée — Rendered as ‘externalised image’. Guénon here states the principle of correspondence between the external world and the inner state of men. Modern chaos is not an external accident; it is the objectified reflection (externalised) of the mental chaos of modern man. Dispersion, instability, the absence of fixed principles in society and in perceived nature correspond to a dispersion, instability and absence of principles in the collective psyche. This is the traditional Hermetic doctrine: ‘as above, so below’. ↩︎
- devenir — Rendered as ‘becoming’. Guénon uses the Greek term genesis (translated as ‘becoming’) opposed to ousia (stable being). Pure ‘becoming’ without being is a logical impossibility: if everything changes, no fixed point allows one to measure change. To affirm that everything is change (the radicalised Heraclitean thesis) amounts to destroying the very meaning of change. Guénon recalls that true tradition recognises change as a mode of manifested being, but never as an autonomous substance. ↩︎
- Zénon d’Élée — Rendered as ‘Zeno of Elea’. Greek philosopher of the 5th century BCE, famous for his paradoxes (Achilles and the tortoise, the flying arrow, etc.). Guénon interprets these paradoxes not as logical games but as reductio ad absurdum of the thesis that being reduces to becoming. If everything is multiplicity and movement (as with the atomists Democritus and Leucippus), then thought becomes impossible, because no point of rest allows intellection. Zeno thus defended the unity of being of Parmenides against pluralism and becoming. ↩︎
- Héraclite — Rendered as ‘Heraclitus’. Greek philosopher (c. 500 BCE) who taught that everything flows (panta rhei) and that change is the only reality. Guénon mentions him to show that pure becoming was already proposed in Antiquity, but that it was an exception combated by tradition (Parmenides, Zeno, Plato). The difference with modernity is that this Heraclitean thesis has become dominant, no longer marginal. Guénon subtly suggests that pre‑Platonic Greek philosophy was already a decadence relative to older Oriental traditions. ↩︎
- dissolubilité de toutes choses — Rendered as ‘dissolubility of all things’. Guénon alludes to the Buddhist doctrine of anitya (universal impermanence) and śūnyatā (emptiness). This reference must be understood with caution: Guénon always distinguishes between the exoteric (literal) and esoteric (symbolic) doctrine of Buddhism. The affirmation that ‘all things are dissoluble’ (i.e., without self-substance, anātman) is, in its profound interpretation, not a nihilism but a method for overcoming attachment to phenomena and attaining the unconditioned (nirvāṇa). But certain Buddhist schools (for instance, some currents of Madhyamaka misunderstood) may have tipped into a ‘becoming’ without principle, which Guénon criticises as a deviation. ↩︎
- généralisation — Rendered as ‘generalisation’. Guénon insists on the quantitative distinction. Doctrines of pure becoming have always existed as marginal deviations. The radical novelty of the modern Occident is their universal triumph: they are no longer reserved for a few misguided intellectuals but become common sense, the ‘mentality’ of the masses. This generalisation is the sign that the Kali Yuga is entering its terminal phase, where evil is no longer contained but spreads like a tide. ↩︎
Guénon’s footnotes
- for one of their principal theses was that of the ‘dissolubility of all things’ — Shortly after its origin, Buddhism in India became associated with one of the principal manifestations of the revolt of the Kṣatriyas against the authority of the Brāhmaṇas; and, as is easy to understand from the preceding indications, there exists, generally speaking, a very direct link between the denial of any immutable principle and that of spiritual authority, between the reduction of all reality to “becoming” and the affirmation of the supremacy of temporal power, whose proper domain is the world of action; and one could observe that the appearance of “naturalistic” or antimetaphysical doctrines always occurs when the element representing temporal power takes, in a civilisation, predominance over that representing spiritual authority.