¶4 The question that matters in this regard, moreover, is not that of a factual predominance, which is, all things considered, a matter of temperament or race, but rather that of what one might call a predominance of right;1 and the two things are linked only up to a certain point. Undoubtedly, the recognition of the superiority of one of the two tendencies will incite one to develop it as much as possible, in preference to the other; but, in application, it is none the less true that the place that contemplation and action will hold in the whole life of a man or a people will always result in large part from the nature of the latter, for one must take into account in this the particular possibilities of each.2 It is manifest that the aptitude for contemplation is more widespread and more generally developed among Orientals; there is probably no country where it is as much so as in India, and this is why India can be considered as representing par excellence what we have called the Oriental spirit. On the other hand, it is incontestable that, in a general way, the aptitude for action, or the tendency that results from this aptitude, is that which predominates among Occidental peoples, as regards the great majority of individuals, and that, even if this tendency were not exaggerated and deviated as it is at present, it would nonetheless subsist, so that contemplation could never there be anything but the affair of a much more restricted élite;3 this is why it is readily said in India that, if the Occident were to return to a normal state and possessed a regular social organisation, one would doubtless find there many Kṣatriyas, but few Brāhmaṇas.4 This would suffice, however, if the intellectual élite were effectively constituted and if its supremacy were recognised, for everything to return to order, because spiritual power is in no way based on number, whose law is the law of matter;5 and moreover, let it be noted well, in antiquity and especially in the Middle Ages, the natural disposition towards action, existing among Occidentals, did not prevent them from recognising the superiority of contemplation, that is to say, of pure intelligence; why is it otherwise in the modern epoch? Is it because Occidentals, in developing their faculties of action beyond measure, have come to lose their intellectuality, and have, to console themselves, invented theories that place action above everything and even go, like ‘pragmatism’, so far as to deny that there exists anything valid outside it, or is it on the contrary this way of seeing that, having first prevailed, brought about the intellectual atrophy that we observe today?6 In both hypotheses, and also in the quite probable case where the truth would be found in a combination of the one and the other, the results are exactly the same; at the point things have reached, it is high time to react, and it is here, let us say once more, that the Orient can come to the aid of the Occident, if the latter is willing, not to impose upon it conceptions that are foreign to it, as some seem to fear, but rather to help it to recover its own tradition, the sense of which it has lost.7
Summary
Guénon distinguishes between factual predominance, which depends on temperament or race, and predominance of right, which concerns true superiority. He observes that the aptitude for contemplation is more widespread among Orientals, especially in India, while among Occidentals the aptitude for action predominates even in normal conditions, so that contemplation could only ever be the affair of a much smaller elite. He notes that in antiquity and the Middle Ages, Occidentals recognised the superiority of contemplation over action, unlike in the modern epoch. Guénon asks whether excessive development of action has caused Occidentals to lose their intellectuality and invent theories that place action above everything, or whether such views first caused intellectual atrophy, but concludes that in either case the results are the same. He therefore argues that the Orient can help the Occident recover its own lost tradition, without imposing foreign conceptions.
General notes
- prédominance de fait / prédominance de droit — Rendered as ‘factual predominance / predominance of right’. A fundamental distinction between the empirical order (what is) and the normative order (what ought to be). Factual predominance belongs to historical, geographical and racial contingencies. Predominance of right belongs to the metaphysical and traditional order, founded on the nature of things. Guénon maintains that even if the Occident is factually more active, this does not justify action being superior to contemplation ‘of right’. This distinction recalls that of Thomas Aquinas between lex facti and lex iuris. ↩︎
- possibilités particulières — Rendered as ‘particular possibilities’. A Guénonian technical term designating the totality of virtualities contained in a being or a collectivity, according to the doctrine of ‘possibilities’ inherited from Vedānta (Sanskrit śakti or vibhūti). Each being or civilisation possesses a field of possibilities proper to it, determined by its nature. The traditional art consists of actualising these possibilities according to their correct hierarchical order, not of levelling them. ↩︎
- élite — Rendered as ‘élite’. Guénon employs this term not in the modern sociological sense (a class privileged by fortune or power), but in the traditional sense: the intellectual élite (Sanskrit vipra or brāhmaṇa) is that which is qualified for metaphysical knowledge and spiritual teaching. In every normal civilisation, this élite is numerically restricted — and must be, for contemplation demands rare conditions. But its rarity in no way diminishes its predominance of right. ↩︎
- Kṣatriyas / Brāhmaṇas — Guénon writes ‘Kshatriyas’ and ‘Brahmanes’; the standard IAST transliteration is Kṣatriya and Brāhmaṇa. These are two of the four varṇa (functional castes) of the Hindu tradition. The Brāhmaṇa are the sacerdotal and intellectual caste, devoted to contemplation and knowledge. The Kṣatriya are the warrior and royal caste, devoted to action and government. Guénon applies this typology to the Occident: a normal Occident would count a majority of Kṣatriya (active) and a minority of Brāhmaṇa (contemplative), but the latter should recognise the spiritual supremacy of the former — that is to say, of sacerdotal power over royal power, according to the traditional doctrine of auctoritas and potestas. ↩︎
- loi de la matière — Rendered as ‘law of matter’. Guénon here states a metaphysical principle: matter (understood as the principle of multiplicity and division) obeys the law of number and quantity. Spirit, by contrast, obeys the law of unity and quality. Spiritual power is therefore not measurable by quantitative criteria (votes, majorities, demographic weight). This is a direct critique of modern democracy, which founds legitimacy on number. For Guénon, a qualified minority can have authority over a non-qualified majority, because true order is qualitative, not quantitative. ↩︎
- pragmatisme — Rendered as ‘pragmatism’. Guénon refers by this term to the American philosophical school founded by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey, for whom the truth of a proposition is measured by its practical consequences. Guénon sees in pragmatism the most accomplished philosophical expression of the modern inversion: not only is action placed above contemplation, but knowledge itself is reduced to an instrument of action. This is the complete reversal of the traditional doctrine, where action (even ritual action) is only a means subordinated to knowledge. ↩︎
- sa propre tradition — Rendered as ‘its own tradition’. Guénon affirms that the Occident possesses an authentic tradition (medieval Christianity, itself heir to Greco-Roman antiquity and Jewish revelation), but that it has lost the profound sense of it, that is to say, the metaphysical and initiatic dimension. The Orient does not come to bring a ‘foreign’ tradition to the Occident, but to help it recover the understanding of its own tradition, which late scholasticism, the Reformation, and then the Enlightenment gradually emptied of its spiritual substance. This is the central thesis of the sophia perennis: one single universal Tradition, variously expressed according to civilisations. ↩︎
Guénon’s footnotes
- one would doubtless find there many Kṣatriyas, but few Brāhmaṇas — Contemplation and action, indeed, are respectively the proper functions of the first two castes, that of the Brāhmaṇas and that of the Kṣatriyas; thus their relations are at the same time those of spiritual authority and temporal power; but we do not intend to consider this side of the question specially here, as it would deserve to be treated separately.