¶10 One must also note that the ‘philosophies of becoming’, under the influence of the very recent idea of ‘progress’, have taken on in modern times a special form that theories of the same kind had never had among the ancients: this form, moreover susceptible of multiple varieties, is what one can, in a general way, designate by the name ‘evolutionism’.1 We shall not return to what we have already said elsewhere on this subject; we shall only recall that every conception which admits nothing other than ‘becoming’ is necessarily, by that very fact, a ‘naturalist’ conception, implying as such a formal negation of that which is beyond nature, that is to say of the metaphysical domain, which is the domain of immutable and eternal principles.2 We shall also point out, with respect to these anti-metaphysical theories, that the Bergsonian idea of ‘pure duration’ corresponds exactly to that dispersion into instantaneity of which we spoke above; the alleged intuition that models itself on the incessant flux of sensible things, far from being able to be the means of a true knowledge, represents in reality the dissolution of all possible knowledge.3
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Summary

Guénon observes that under the influence of the modern idea of progress, ‘philosophies of becoming’ have taken on a special form called evolutionism, which had no equivalent among the ancients. He recalls that any conception admitting nothing but becoming is necessarily naturalist, implying a formal negation of the metaphysical domain of immutable and eternal principles. He further points out that Bergson’s idea of ‘pure duration’ corresponds exactly to the dispersion into instantaneity he described earlier. Guénon concludes that such an alleged intuition, modelled on the incessant flux of sensible things, far from being a means of true knowledge, represents the dissolution of all possible knowledge.

General notes

  1. idée de progrès / évolutionnisme — Rendered as ‘idea of progress / evolutionism’. Guénon distinguishes simple philosophical ‘becoming’ (Heraclitus) from modern ‘evolutionism’, which adds an implicit teleological direction: becoming is no longer cyclical or indifferent, but oriented towards a linear and cumulative progress. The idea of ‘progress’ (appearing in the 18th century with Turgot, Condorcet) is for Guénon a typically modern superstition, founded on ignorance of traditional cosmic cycles. ‘Evolutionism’ (Darwin, Spencer, then Bergson) transposes this belief into the biological and cosmic domain, as if the entire universe ‘progresses’ towards ever greater complexity. ↩︎
  2. naturaliste — Rendered as ‘naturalist’. Guénon employs this term not in the sense of natural history, but in the philosophical sense: ‘naturalism’ is the doctrine that reduces all reality to nature (physis) and denies the supernatural or the transcendent metaphysical. Naturalism includes materialism, physicalism, and every form of immanentism. To affirm that only ‘becoming’ exists is implicitly to deny that there are immutable principles beyond the phenomenal flux — therefore to deny metaphysics as a science of the transcendent. ↩︎
  3. Bergson / durée pure — Rendered as ‘Bergson / pure duration’. Henri Bergson (1859‑1941), a very influential French philosopher at the time when Guénon was writing. Bergson opposed the measurable and spatialised time of science to ‘lived time’ or ‘pure duration’, a continuous and heterogeneous flux of consciousness. Guénon sees in this doctrine a radicalisation of becoming: ‘pure duration’ is a change without stable landmarks, a dispersion ‘into instantaneity’. Bergsonian intuition (which seeks to ‘coincide’ with this flux) cannot, for Guénon, lead to any true knowledge, for knowledge requires a fixed point, an immutable principle that transcends flux. Bergson is thus accused of the ‘dissolution’ of the intellect. ↩︎