¶10 In the mental confusion that characterises our epoch, people have come to apply indiscriminately this same word ‘tradition’ to all sorts of things, often quite insignificant, like simple customs without any import and sometimes of quite recent origin;1 we have pointed out elsewhere a similar abuse with regard to the word ‘religion’. One must beware of these deviations of language, which betray a kind of degeneration of the corresponding ideas; and it is not because someone calls himself a ‘traditionalist’ that one can be sure that he knows, even imperfectly, what tradition is in the true sense of this word.2 For our part, we absolutely refuse to give this name to anything that is of a purely human order; it is not inopportune to declare this expressly when one encounters at every turn, for example, an expression like ‘traditional philosophy’. A philosophy, even if it is truly all that it can be, has no right to this title, because it remains entirely within the rational order, even if it does not deny what surpasses it, and because it is merely a construction built by human individuals, without revelation or inspiration of any kind, or, to sum it all up in a single word, because it is something essentially ‘profane’.3 Moreover, despite all the illusions in which some seem to delight, it is certainly not a merely ‘bookish’ science that can suffice to set right the mentality of a race and an epoch; and for that something else is needed than philosophical speculation, which, even in the most favourable case, is condemned by its very nature to remain quite external and far more verbal than real.4 To restore lost tradition, to truly revivify it, contact with the living traditional spirit is necessary, and, as we have already said, it is only in the East that this spirit is still fully alive;5 none the less it remains true that this presupposes above all, in the West, an aspiration towards a return to this traditional spirit, but it can hardly be more than a simple aspiration. The few ‘anti-modern’ reactionary movements, moreover quite incomplete in our view, that have so far appeared, can only confirm us in this conviction, for all this, which is no doubt excellent in its negative and critical part, is nevertheless very far from a restoration of true intellectuality and develops only within the limits of a quite restricted mental horizon.6 Yet this is something, in the sense that it is an indication of a state of mind of which one would have had great difficulty finding the slightest trace only a few years ago; if not all Westerners are still unanimous in contenting themselves with the exclusively material development of modern civilisation, that is perhaps a sign that, for them, all hope of salvation is not yet entirely lost.

Summary

Guénon criticises the mental confusion of the epoch, where the word ‘tradition’ is indiscriminately applied to insignificant things, like simple customs. He refuses to give this name to anything of a purely human order, such as ‘traditional philosophy’, because philosophy remains within the rational and profane order, without revelation or inspiration. Bookish science cannot set right the mentality of an epoch. To restore lost tradition, contact with the living traditional spirit is necessary, which is still fully alive only in the East. The few anti-modern reactionary movements in the West, though incomplete, are a positive sign: they indicate that not all Westerners content themselves with the material development of modern civilisation, and that hope of salvation is not yet entirely lost.

General notes

  1. de simples coutumes sans aucune portée et parfois d’origine toute récente — Rendered as ‘simple customs without any import and sometimes of quite recent origin’. Guénon here denounces the abusive extension of the term ‘tradition’ to purely human phenomena having no connection with the metaphysical deposit. For example: ‘fashion tradition’ (certain local modes), ‘culinary tradition’, ‘artisanal tradition’ (in its merely technical aspect), or even customs invented in the 19th century (like the ‘Scottish tradition’ of the kilt, which is in fact modern). These usages empty the word of its sacred meaning and contribute to the mental confusion where one no longer distinguishes between the spiritual order and the temporal order, between the timeless and the ephemeral. ↩︎
  2. la tradition au vrai sens de ce mot — Rendered as ‘tradition in the true sense of this word’. The true meaning, for Guénon, goes back etymologically to tradere (to transmit). Tradition is an unbroken transmission, of non-human origin, of metaphysical principles, initiatic rites and a sacred symbolism. It presupposes a regular chain of transmission from the primordial origin down to our own days, a coherent doctrine and an effective spiritual centre. Any ‘tradition’ that does not fulfil these conditions (absence of a chain, recent human origin, artificial syncretism) is a pseudo-tradition, even if it adorns itself with the name ‘traditionalist’. ↩︎
  3. essentiellement « profane » — Rendered as ‘essentially “profane”’. ‘Profane’ here is opposed to ‘sacred’ and ‘initiatic’. Philosophy, even academic metaphysics (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel), remains a discursive activity of individual reason, not a revealed or inspired transmission. It can certainly speak of God, the Soul, Being, but it does not possess the character of absolute certainty and transfiguring efficacy that only initiation confers. Guénon does not reject all philosophy (he respects Plato and Plotinus as forerunners), but he refuses to call it ‘tradition’, because tradition is superior to philosophy as revelation is to mere speculation. ↩︎
  4. beaucoup plus verbale que réelle — Rendered as ‘far more verbal than real’. Guénon here criticises the intellectualist illusion that believes that bookish knowledge (erudition, philology, academic exegesis) suffices to restore a tradition. Tradition is not a collection of texts to study, but a living reality to embody. One can accumulate volumes of commentaries on the Upaniṣads without understanding their spirit. ‘Verbal restoration’ (creating a ‘traditional’ discourse without transmission) is a delusion: it produces only ‘salon traditionalists’ who speak of the sophia perennis as an abstract theory, not as an inner transformation. ↩︎
  5. ce n’est qu’en Orient que cet esprit est encore pleinement vivant — Rendered as ‘it is only in the East that this spirit is still fully alive’. Guénon does not mean that any ‘Easterner’ (a person living in Asia) possesses this spirit, but that the authentic traditional forms (Hindu, Islamic, Chinese, Japanese, Tibetan Buddhist) have preserved their initiatic chain, their pure metaphysics and their spiritual efficacy. In the West, the Roman Catholic Church has lost Christian esotericism (except for fragmentary survivals), Rabbinic Judaism has externalised the Kabbalah, and the rest (regular Freemasonry, Rosicrucianism) is either weakened or incomplete. The ‘living traditional spirit’ designates the effective presence of an initiatic transmission capable of granting access to metaphysical intellection, not a mere aesthetic admiration for Asian temples or rites. ↩︎
  6. un horizon mental assez restreint — Rendered as ‘a quite restricted mental horizon’. Guénon here targets movements such as ‘Action Française’ (Maurras), ‘integrist Catholic traditionalism’ (Louis de Bonald, Joseph de Maistre in his political part), or yet ‘regionalism’ and ‘romantic nationalism’. These movements usefully criticise modernity (democracy, materialism, individualism), but they do so in the name of a return to a historical past (monarchy, ancient order) without raising their gaze as far as metaphysical principles. Their horizon remains political, social or aesthetic; they do not undertake the restoration of pure intellect nor offer any genuine initiation. Guénon sometimes calls them ‘reactionaries’ rather than ‘traditionalists’, because they react against the modern without having accessed the supra-rational. ↩︎