¶8 The word ‘philosophy’ itself can certainly be taken in a very legitimate sense, which was doubtless its primitive meaning, especially if it is true that, as is claimed, it was Pythagoras who first used it: etymologically, it means nothing other than ‘love of wisdom’; thus it designates first of all a preliminary disposition required to attain wisdom, and it can also designate, by a perfectly natural extension, the search which, arising from that very disposition, must lead to knowledge.1 It is therefore only a preliminary and preparatory stage, a way towards wisdom, a degree corresponding to a state inferior to it; the deviation that subsequently occurred consisted in taking this transitory stage as the goal itself, in pretending to substitute ‘philosophy’ for wisdom, which implies the forgetting or the misunderstanding of the true nature of the latter.2 Thus was born what we may call ‘profane’ philosophy, that is to say, a pretended purely human wisdom, therefore of a simply rational order, taking the place of true traditional wisdom, supra-rational and ‘non-human’.3 Yet something of it still subsisted throughout antiquity; this is proved, first, by the persistence of the ‘mysteries’, whose essentially ‘initiatory’ character cannot be disputed, and also by the fact that the teaching of the philosophers themselves most often had both an ‘exoteric’ side and an ‘esoteric’ side, the latter allowing attachment to a superior point of view, which moreover manifests itself very clearly, though perhaps incompletely in some respects, a few centuries later, among the Alexandrians.4 For ‘profane’ philosophy to be definitively constituted as such, it was necessary that ‘exotericism’ alone should remain and that one should go so far as the pure and simple negation of all ‘esotericism’; this is precisely what the movement begun by the Greeks was to lead to among the moderns; the tendencies that had already asserted themselves among the latter were then to be pushed to their most extreme consequences, and the excessive importance that they had accorded to rational thought was to be further accentuated so as to arrive at ‘rationalism’, a specifically modern attitude which consists, no longer even simply in ignoring, but in expressly denying everything that is of a supra-rational order;5 but let us not anticipate further, for we shall have to return to these consequences and see their development in another part of our exposition.
Summary
The word ‘philosophy’ etymologically means ‘love of wisdom’, a preliminary and preparatory stage towards wisdom. The deviation occurred when this transitory stage was mistaken for the goal itself, substituting philosophy for wisdom. Thus was born ‘profane’ philosophy: a pretended purely human and rational wisdom, taking the place of true traditional wisdom, which is supra-rational and ‘non-human’. Yet something of true wisdom subsisted throughout antiquity: the persistence of the mysteries (initiatory character) and the fact that philosophers’ teaching often had both an exoteric and an esoteric side, allowing attachment to a superior point of view (notably among the Alexandrians). For profane philosophy to be definitively constituted, exotericism alone had to remain and all esotericism be negated. This is what the moderns achieved, pushing the tendencies begun by the Greeks to their extreme consequences, arriving at rationalism, which expressly denies everything of a supra-rational order.
General notes
- « philosophie » … « amour de la sagesse » — Rendered as 'philosophy … love of wisdom'. Guénon recalls the Greek etymology: philein (to love) + sophia (wisdom). He admits that Pythagoras may have used this term to mark modestly his search for a wisdom that he did not claim to possess. This primitive meaning is legitimate and not corrupting. But Guénon emphasises that, from the outset, the term indicates a relationship of inferiority (love is not possession): philosophy is a preparatory path, not wisdom itself. The modern deviation has been to take this path for the goal. ↩︎
- déviation … substituer la philosophie à la sagesse — Rendered as 'deviation … substituting philosophy for wisdom'. Guénon radically distinguishes between wisdom (effective knowledge, possession of truth, direct metaphysical knowledge, often of initiatory or revealed origin) and philosophy (discursive, rational, indefinite search that never ends in certainty). The deviation is to take philosophy not as a means, but as an end. This is the fundamental error of rationalism: believing that human reason can be self-sufficient and replace traditional sources of knowledge. This error is properly 'modern', even if its germs appear in antiquity. ↩︎
- philosophie « profane » — Rendered as 'profane philosophy'. Guénon coins the expression 'profane philosophy' to distinguish it from traditional wisdom, which he sometimes calls 'non-human' (of transcendent origin). Profane philosophy is a wisdom without God, without revelation, without initiation, without authentic metaphysics; it reduces to a game of concepts, reasonings and opinions. It is the philosophy of the Enlightenment, of modern universities, of 'rational' debate that ignores any principle superior to individual reason. Guénon does not reject reason itself (which has its legitimate place), but its pretension to be the only source of knowledge. ↩︎
- mystères … ésotérique/exotérique … Alexandrins — Rendered as 'mysteries … esoteric/exoteric … Alexandrians'. Guénon recalls that in antiquity (Greek, Egyptian, Persian, etc.), knowledge was not public and uniform. The mysteries were reserved initiations, transmitting a superior teaching, often unwritten. The great philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, the Neoplatonists) distinguished between an external teaching (exoteric) for the public and an internal teaching (esoteric) for advanced disciples. Among the Alexandrians (Philo, Plotinus, Proclus), this esotericism approaches the oriental metaphysical tradition. Modernity has broken with this distinction, recognising only the exoteric (public, academic, critical teaching), even denying the very existence of the esoteric. This denial is a symptom of the loss of traditional meaning. ↩︎
- rationalisme moderne … négation du suprarationnel — Rendered as 'modern rationalism … negation of the supra-rational'. Guénon characterises the modern attitude by one word: rationalism. Rationalism is not merely the use of reason, but the affirmation that reason is the only valid faculty of knowledge, and that everything not accessible to reason (intellectual intuition, revelation, initiation, direct metaphysical knowledge) is either illusory or non-existent. This is an a priori refusal, not a conclusion from experience. Guénon opposes to this rationalism the tradition, which recognises orders of knowledge superior to reason (the intellect, spiritual intuition, knowledge by identification). Modern rationalism is therefore, for him, a form of voluntary blindness. ↩︎
Guénon’s footnotes
- It is therefore only a preliminary and preparatory stage, a way towards wisdom, a degree corresponding to a state inferior to it — The relationship here is roughly the same as that which exists, in the Taoist doctrine, between the state of the “gifted man” and that of the “transcendent man”.