¶8 As we draw nearer to the West, we see that the same epoch was, among the Jews, that of the Babylonian captivity;1 and what is perhaps one of the most astonishing facts to be noted is that a short period of seventy years was sufficient to make them lose even their writing, since they had later to reconstitute the Sacred Books with characters entirely different from those that had been in use until then.2 Many other events could be cited relating to approximately the same date: we shall only note that for Rome it was the beginning of the properly ‘historical’ period, succeeding the ‘legendary’ epoch of the kings;3 and we also know, though somewhat vaguely, that there were then important movements among the Celtic peoples;4 but without insisting further on these, we shall come to what concerns Greece. There likewise, the 6th century was the starting point of so-called ‘classical’ civilisation, the only one to which moderns recognise the ‘historical’ character, and all that precedes it is so little known as to be treated as ‘legendary’, although recent archaeological discoveries no longer permit us to doubt that, at least, there was a very real civilisation there;5 and we have some reasons to think that this first Hellenic civilisation was much more interesting intellectually than that which followed it, and that their relations are not without offering some analogy with those existing between medieval Europe and modern Europe.6 However, it should be noted that the split was not as radical as in the latter case, for there was, at least partially, a re-adaptation effected in the traditional order, mainly in the domain of the ‘mysteries’;7 and to this must be attached Pythagoreanism, which was above all, in a new form, a restoration of earlier Orphism, and whose evident links with the Delphic cult of Hyperborean Apollo even allow us to envisage a continuous and regular filiation with one of the most ancient traditions of humanity.8 But, on the other hand, there soon appeared something of which there had been no previous example and which was later to exercise a pernicious influence on the whole Western world: we mean that special mode of thought which took and kept the name of ‘philosophy’;9 and this point is important enough for us to pause over it for a few moments.
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intellectkali-yuga

Summary

As we draw nearer to the West, Guénon observes that the same epoch was, for the Jews, the Babylonian captivity. A short period of seventy years was enough to make them lose even their writing, which they had to reconstitute with different characters. For Rome, this was the beginning of the properly historical period, succeeding the legendary epoch of the kings. In Greece, the 6th century was the starting point of so-called classical civilisation, the only one moderns recognise as historical, though recent archaeological discoveries show a very real earlier civilisation existed. Guénon thinks this first Hellenic civilisation was intellectually more interesting. He notes that the split was not as radical as in modern Europe, because there was a partial re-adaptation in the traditional order, particularly in the mysteries, to which Pythagoreanism (a restoration of earlier Orphism) belongs. However, there then appeared philosophy, a new mode of thought that would exercise a pernicious influence on the whole Western world.

General notes

  1. captivité de Babylone — Rendered as 'Babylonian captivity'. Guénon refers here to the deportation of the Judaean elites to Babylon by Nebuchadnezzar (597-538 BCE), a major event that profoundly marked Israel's historical consciousness. He emphasises the symbolic aspect: a brutal rupture in the transmission of a tradition, marked by the loss even of writing and the need to reconstitute the sacred scriptures with different characters. For Guénon, this is not an ordinary historical accident, but a sign of the end of an epoch and the transition to another, corresponding both to Israel's entry into 'profane' history and to its adaptation to new cyclical conditions. ↩︎
  2. perdre jusqu’à leur écriture — Rendered as 'lose even their writing'. Guénon alludes to the tradition according to which the Jews used a paleo-Hebrew script (derived from Phoenician) before the exile, and adopted the 'square' script (Assyrian or Aramaic) after the return from Babylon. The fact that the Sacred Books had to be 'reconstituted' suggests that not only the script, but also part of the oral and written transmission had been interrupted. For Guénon, this is a striking example of how a cyclical rupture (the entry into the Kali-Yuga) affects not only institutions, but the very forms of material culture and transmission. ↩︎
  3. Rome … période « historique » — Rendered as 'Rome … 'historical' period'. Roman tradition places the foundation of the Republic in 509 BCE, shortly after the end of Etruscan kingship. It is from this date that the Roman annals become more precise and that modern historians consider Roman history as 'historical' (as opposed to the 'legendary' period of the seven kings). Guénon notes the coincidence with the 6th century, confirming his idea of a common barrier for all Mediterranean and Middle Eastern civilisations. ↩︎
  4. mouvements chez les peuples celtiques — Rendered as 'movements among the Celtic peoples'. Guénon refers to the Celtic migrations (Hallstatt, La Tène) which, in the 6th century BCE, saw the expansion of the Celts into Central Europe, Gaul, the Iberian Peninsula, northern Italy and even Asia Minor (Galatians). Although sources are scarce, archaeology confirms major transformations. Guénon uses this mention to extend his argument to all non-classical Europe, showing that the 6th century marks a rupture even in regions that conventional historiography qualifies as 'prehistoric' or 'legendary'. ↩︎
  5. civilisation antérieure à la Grèce classique — Rendered as 'civilisation anterior to classical Greece'. Guénon alludes to the Mycenaean, Minoan (Cretan) and Cycladic civilisations, which archaeologists of the 19th century had begun to unearth (Schliemann at Mycenae, Evans in Crete). These discoveries showed that ancient Greece did not begin with Homer and the classical cities, but that a brilliant, older civilisation had preceded it. Guénon sees this as confirmation of his thesis: before the 6th century, there were 'real' civilisations that profane history ignores because they do not correspond to its criteria (writing, stone monuments, precise chronology). It is not they that are 'legendary', it is the pretension of modern history to know only what has left traces legible to it. ↩︎
  6. analogie entre Grèce archaïque et Grèce classique / Moyen Âge et modernité — Rendered as 'analogy between archaic Greece and classical Greece / the Middle Ages and modernity'. Guénon draws a parallel between two ruptures: that between Greece anterior to the 6th century (Mycenaean, Minoan) and classical Greece (city-states, philosophy), and that between medieval Europe (Christian, traditional) and modern Europe (Renaissance, materialism). In both cases, the earlier civilisation is more 'intellectually interesting' (more traditional, more metaphysical); the later civilisation marks a fall into the profane, superficiality and individualism. It is not a matter of progress, but of cyclical degradation. ↩︎
  7. réadaptation dans le domaine des « mystères » — Rendered as 're-adaptation in the domain of the 'mysteries''. Guénon emphasises that, unlike the modern rupture (which rejected almost all tradition), classical Greece preserved, in an adapted form, certain traditional elements, notably the mystery cults (Eleusis, Orphism, Dionysus, etc.). These mysteries were esoteric institutions that transmitted metaphysical knowledge and initiatory rites. Their existence shows that tradition was not completely interrupted, but only veiled and reserved for an elite. This situation is analogous to the distinction between esotericism and exotericism in other traditions (Taoism/Confucianism in China, Hinduism with its initiatory schools). ↩︎
  8. Pythagorisme, Orphisme, Apollon hyperboréen — Rendered as 'Pythagoreanism, Orphism, Hyperborean Apollo'. Guénon presents here a traditional view of Greek history: Pythagoreanism would not be a new invention, but the restoration (in a form adapted to the conditions of the Kali-Yuga) of a more ancient teaching, that of Orpheus (a mythical figure but bearer of a real initiatory tradition). Orpheus himself would be linked to a Hyperborean cult of Apollo, that is to say to a non-Greek, northern, even more ancient tradition. This continuous filiation (despite apparent ruptures) illustrates the thesis of the sophia perennis: the same primordial wisdom is transmitted through the ages and civilisations, in different external forms. ↩︎
  9. « philosophie » comme rupture néfaste — Rendered as 'philosophy' as a pernicious rupture. Guénon makes a severe judgment on Greek philosophy (and, by extension, on all Western philosophy). What is new in the 6th century is not rational thought (which already existed), but the pretension of human reason to be self-sufficient, to substitute itself for traditional authority and to construct autonomous systems cut off from all revelation or initiation. Philosophy, for Guénon, is not a wisdom, but a disease of the intellect, a form of rationalism that opens the way to materialism, scepticism and individualism. He distinguishes radically between traditional wisdom (which has a transcendent origin) and philosophy (which is a human invention). ↩︎