¶6 It is a rather strange fact, one that seems never to have been noticed as it deserves to be.1 Namely, that the properly ‘historical’ period, in the sense we have just indicated, goes back exactly to the 6th century before the Christian era,2 as if there were there, in time, a barrier that cannot be crossed by the means of investigation available to ordinary researchers.3 From that epoch onward, indeed, one possesses everywhere a fairly precise and well-established chronology;4 for everything earlier, on the contrary, one obtains in general only a very vague approximation, and the dates proposed for the same events often vary by several centuries. Even for countries where one has more than simple scattered vestiges, such as Egypt for example, this is very striking;5 and what is perhaps even more astonishing is that, in an exceptional and privileged case such as that of China, which possesses, for much more distant epochs, annals dated by means of astronomical observations that should leave no room for doubt, moderns nevertheless qualify those epochs as ‘legendary’,6 as if there were a domain where they recognise no right to any certainty and where they themselves forbid themselves from obtaining any. So-called ‘classical’ antiquity is therefore, properly speaking, only a wholly relative antiquity, and even much closer to modern times than to true antiquity, since it does not even go back halfway into the Kali-Yuga,7 whose duration is itself, according to Hindu doctrine, only one-tenth that of the Manvantara;8 and one will thereby judge sufficiently how right moderns are to be proud of the extent of their historical knowledge! All that, they would doubtless reply again in their own justification, is only ‘legendary’ periods,9 and that is why they consider they need not take them into account; but this response is precisely only the avowal of their ignorance, and of a misunderstanding that alone can explain their disdain for tradition;10 the specifically modern spirit, indeed, as we shall show further on, is nothing other than the anti-traditional spirit.11
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kali-yugamanvantara

Summary

Guénon points out a strange fact: the properly ‘historical’ period begins exactly around the 6th century BCE, as if a barrier exists that ordinary researchers cannot cross. Before this, chronology is vague and proposed dates vary by centuries. Even in Egypt this is striking. In China, despite precise astronomical dating for much earlier epochs, moderns still call them ‘legendary’, refusing any certainty. Guénon argues that ‘classical’ antiquity is only a relative antiquity, much closer to modern times than to true antiquity, not even reaching halfway into the Kali-Yuga. He mocks modern pride in historical knowledge. The modern dismissal of these periods as ‘legendary’ reveals ignorance and misunderstanding. The specifically modern spirit, he concludes, is nothing other than the anti-traditional spirit.

General notes

  1. fait assez étrange — Rendered as 'rather strange fact'. Guénon here emphasises the systematic ignorance of moderns faced with a chronological discontinuity that is not accidental but symbolic. It is not a lack of data, but a principled refusal to consider what does not fit the criteria of profane history. The 'barrier' of the 6th century BCE is therefore less temporal than epistemological. ↩︎
  2. VIe siècle avant l'ère chrétienne — Rendered as '6th century before the Christian era'. Guénon insists on the precision of this date, which cannot be due to chance. This century saw, in civilisations without contact with each other, major upheavals: the appearance of Buddhism in India, the last Zoroaster in Persia, the separation of Taoism and Confucianism in China, the emergence of the first philosophers (Pythagoras, Thales) in Greece. This simultaneity is not explained by ordinary historical causes, but by a cyclical law related to the end of a great age. ↩︎
  3. barrière … moyens d'investigation des chercheurs ordinaires — Rendered as 'barrier … means of investigation available to ordinary researchers'. Guénon opposes the methods of profane scholarship (archaeology, textual criticism, physico-chemical dating) to traditional knowledge, which rests on non-written transmission and doctrinal authority. The barrier is not absolute, but relative to the point of view adopted. 'Ordinary researchers' encounter this limit because they refuse non-profane sources (myths, legends, oral traditions). It is not their method that is insufficient, it is their horizon. ↩︎
  4. chronologie assez précise et bien établie — Rendered as 'fairly precise and well-established chronology'. Guénon does not dispute the factual accuracy of these chronologies, but their scope. They are valid for the recent profane order, but powerless to account for earlier ages, which are longer and structured differently. The increasing precision of modern datings should not mask the narrowness of their temporal field. ↩︎
  5. Égypte — Rendered as 'Egypt'. Guénon alludes to the work of traditionalist scholars (such as Schwaller de Lubicz) who saw in Egyptian antiquity a civilisation far older and intellectually higher than academic Egyptology admits. The absence of absolute chronology is not proof of lesser value, but an indicator of a different temporality. ↩︎
  6. annales chinoises … « légendaires » — Rendered as 'Chinese annals … legendary'. Guénon uses the Chinese example to show the arbitrariness of the qualification 'historical'. The Chinese annals, established by precise astronomical observations, are nevertheless rejected by academic orientalism on the grounds that they do not correspond to Western schemas. Guénon restores the positive sense of 'legendary': not 'false', but relating to a mode of non-historical transmission and bearing a truth of a symbolic or metaphysical order. ↩︎
  7. Kali-Yuga — Guénon recalls Hindu chronology: the Kali-Yuga began in 3102 BCE. Its halfway point is therefore around 1500 BCE. So-called classical antiquity (Greece, Rome, late Egypt) is therefore well after this halfway point, and even closer to us than to the origins of the cycle. This relativisation of classical antiquity is a critique of historical Eurocentrism. ↩︎
  8. Manvantara — Guénon recalls the immensity of cyclical times: a Manvantara lasts 4.32 million years. The Kali-Yuga is only one-tenth of it (432,000 years). Even this last period is longer than the 'classical' human history known to moderns. The ignorance of these figures by profane historians is not only a factual lacuna, but an inability to conceive of temporalities other than that of event-based history. ↩︎
  9. périodes « légendaires » — Rendered as 'legendary periods'. Guénon writes ironically: the modern qualifies as 'legendary' anything that exceeds the narrow framework of his historicism. In so doing, he confuses 'unverifiable by my method' with 'non-existent'. This attitude is not scientific, it is dogmatic. It reveals a bias of closure to any other form of knowledge. ↩︎
  10. dédain de la tradition — Rendered as 'disdain for tradition'. Guénon analyses the modern refusal of non-Western or ancient traditions as an effect of misunderstanding, not as a rational judgment. Guénonian tradition (in the singular, with a capital letter) is the immutable transmission of a metaphysical truth through the ages and civilisations. To reject it without having understood it is a sign of ignorance, not of lucidity. ↩︎
  11. esprit antitraditionnel — Rendered as 'anti-traditional spirit'. Central formula of Guénon's work. The modern spirit is not merely indifferent to tradition, it is its active opposite. Anti-tradition is not the absence of principles, but the will to deny them or replace them with human constructions. This formula explains why modernity, even in its supposedly 'spiritual' forms, remains trapped in the same refusal. ↩︎